DNA evidence by Hammond, Vicky J.
e 
AS74 
vuw 
A66 
H227 
1991 
/ 
VICKY J. HAMMOND 
DNA EVIDENCE 
LLM Research Paper 
Evidence, Proof and Procedure 
LAWS 544 
Law Faculty 
Victoria University of Wellington 
1 October 1991 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance I received from others in 
researching this paper. In particular, thanks goes to Murray Gibson 
and Lowell Goddard QC (Counsel in the Pengelly case), Patricia 
Stapleton (DNA Diagnostics), Steve Cordiner (DSIR), Steve Haslett 
(Victoria University), and Chris Triggs (Auckland University). And 
special thanks to my supervisors, Bernard Robertson and Tony 
Vignaux, for all their inspirations and enthusiasm. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. DNA PROFILING 5 
1. The Technique 5 
1.1 What is DNA? 6 
1.2 The Process of DNA Profiling 7 
1.3 Multi-locus probes and Single locus probes 9 
1.4 The Testing Laboratories 10 
2. A Comparison with Conventional Tests 14 
3. Interpreting DNA Results 1 7 
3.1 Matching Bands 17 
(a) Criminal Identification 18 
(b) Parentage 20 
3.2 Statistics 20 
(a) Criminal Identification 
(b) Parentage 
3.3 Population Data 
3.4 The Product Rule 
4. The Impact of DNA Profiling in the Law 
4.1 Applications 
(a) Criminal 
(b) Parentage 
4.2 Limitations 
III. DNA EVIDENCE IN COURT 
5.1 General Admissibility of Expert Evidence 
5.2 Novel Scientific Evidence 
23 
26 
27 
29 
30 
30 
30 
31 
32 
34 
35 
36 
IV. 
5.3 Admissibility and Weight 
5.4 Judges, Lawyers and Juries 
5.5 Statistics in Court 
5.6 The Role of the Expert Witness 
CASES 
6. New Zealand 
6.1 R v Pengelly 
6.2 Byers v Nicholls 
6.3 Loveridge v Adlam 
7. United States 
7.1 State of Florida v Andrews 
7.2 People v Castro 
8. Australia 
8.1 R v Elliott 
8.2 R v Tran 
V. CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
38 
40 
41 
45 
46 
46 
46 
51 
52 
54 
54 
54 
56 
56 
58 
60 
62 
1 
I, INTRODUCTION 
DNA profilingl is a powerful new technique which is likely to have 
considerable impact upon the New Zealand legal system. It is a method 
of identifying an individual by analysis of their unique genetic 
material. The development of DNA profiling tests has been heralded as 
revolutionary, and some have described it in terms such as:2 
the most potentially far-reaching scientific advance to offer 
assistance to the crimin al justice system since the development 
of fingerprint analysis. 
The principal strength of the new tests lies in their potential 
capacity to identify individuals with an accuracy that is unmatched by 
conventional methods of testing body samples . DNA technolo g y 
promises to be particularly u s eful for identifying criminal s in 
forensic investi gation s . Besides the cl a im of accuracy , an important 
advantage is that DNA tes ts can be performed on many samples whi ch 
are unsuitable for analysis by other means becau se of sm all qu an tities 
or poor quality. DNA profilin g is al so useful for es tabli s hing 
relationships of parentage since DNA is biologically inherited from 
each parent. 
Although DNA profiling was only discovered as recently as the mid-
1980's, it has already gained widespread recognition and use overseas . 
Since its initial debut in court proceedings during 1987, DNA tes t 
results have been admitted in evidence in a great number of civil and 
criminal trials, particularly in Britain and the United States. 
In New Zealand, DNA evidence is only just beginning to appear 
before the courts. The first criminal case in this country where such 
1 DNA profiling is also known as DNA typing, DNA testing, DNA printing and 
DNA fingerprinting, although many people prefer not to use the last of those 
terms to avoid any association with conventional fingerprinting (i.e. fingertip 
patterns). This paper will avoid using the terminology "DNA fingerprinting" for 
this reason . Despite the fact that some of the above terms are patented or 
organisation-specific (see section 1.4, below p 10), they are used here in a 
neutral sense. 
2 I Freckleton "DNA Profiling: Forensic Science under the Microscope" [1990) 14 
Crim LJ 23, 23. 
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evidence was contested is R v Pengelly, which has recently been 
heard on appeal. The accused was found guilty of murdering an 
elderly woman by a High Court jury in April 1990. After the two week 
trial at Auckland, which was largely based on forensic scientific 
evidence, Pengelly was sentenced to life imprisonment by the 
presiding Judge.3 As an interesting sequel to the High Court hearing, 
further DNA tests were carried out on the blood samples obtained from 
the crime scene. Expert analysis of these results was put before a Full 
Court of the Court of Appeal in August 1991.4 The Court decided to 
admit the new evidence, but having regard to all the evidence in the 
case, it considered that no miscarriage of justice had occurred. 
Apart from Pengelly, DNA evidence has appeared in New Zealand 
courts in a sprinkling of other recent cases, but in most of these 
instances, the actual DNA results have not been seriously challcnged. 5 
A few have been cases of disputed paternity6, while the rest have 
involved serious criminal charges such as rape and sexual abuse.7 A 
recurrent problem in the criminal cases is the issue of consent to the 
taking of body samples from the accused. 
In addition, since late 19398 there have been a significant number 
of situations in New Zealand where the accused pleaded guilty to the 
3 (Hearing 27/3/90 - 6/4/90), HC, Auckland, T240/90, Thorp J. A pretrial 
ruling on the admissibility of the DNA evidence is reported at (1991) 5 CRNZ 674 
(HC), Thorp J. 
4 R v Pengelly unrep (23/8/91), CA, 85/90, Cooke P, Casey, Hardie Boys, Gault 
and McKay JJ, (noted at 14:33 TCL 6) 
5 At least in the cases the author has been able to discover. 
6 For example Loveridge v Adlam [1991) NZFLR 267 (FC), Inglis J, 
(Decision awaited; Hearing 26/7/91; parties names not yet publishable; 
n 53) FC, Lower Hutt, FP 517/88, Curruthers J. 
and T v S 
see below 
7 For example R v Montella unrep (13/5/91), HC, Dunedin, T5/91, Williamson 
J, (sexual abuse on person under 12 years), (noted at 14:25 TCL 6 and [1991) BCL 
15:1428), and R v Martin unrep (16/5/91), HC, Wellington, Tl31/90,6/91, 
Hillyer J, (sexual violation), (noted at [1991) BCL 12: 1172). In these two cases 
the issues were consent and refusal to providing body samples. In R v Montella, 
the High Court actually excluded the DNA evidence linking the accused to a 
semen stain from the victim on grounds of consent, because the accused's blood 
sample had only been given for AIDS testing to allay the fears of the 
complainant's father. 
8 According to the Dominion, Wellington, 12 and 16 September 1989, the police 
(in conjunction with the DSIR) were then in a position to begin extensively using 
DNA profiling of suspects. Testing in the Pengelly case was commenced in 
August 1989. 
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crime charged when confronted with DNA evidence. And in the civil 
context, DNA test results have been privately obtained on a number of 
occasion to resolve a paternity matter out of court. As these sorts of 
cases do not come to public attention, legal research is generally 
restricted to the examples which appear in the law reports or which 
are noted in official publications. 
There is no doubt that lawyers and judges will be faced with DNA 
evidence with increasing frequency. While the technique has 
tremendous potential and while the reaction of the legal community 
has generally been "enthusiastic"9; DNA profiling also presents some 
difficult questions about admissibility and reliability of the evidence. 
Since DNA tests will have a major impact on the outcome of a trial, the 
accuracy of the evidence needs to be carefully scrutinised. 
Elsewhere there have been concerns that DNA tests may have been 
prematurely introduced into the court forum, before they have been 
adequately validated. I O This might be less of a problem in New Zealand 
because our scientists have been able to observe the mistakes and 
advances made with DNA technology in other legal systems over the 
last few years. Nevertheless there is still a need to ensure the 
reliability of the results, as with all scientific evidence, 
profiling is to be routinely used in the law. 
if DNA 
This paper provides an introduction to the process of DNA profiling 
and examines its treatment as evidence in a court. Moreover, it will 
address some difficulties likely to be encountered by the legal 
profession in a case involving DNA. 1 1 The problem is not so much one 
9 W C Thompson and S Ford "DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New 
Genetic Identification Tests" [1989) 75 Virginia LR 45, 46 
10 For example concerns were expressed by the Californian Attorney General in 
January 1988: discussed by W C Thompson and S Ford, idem, and by A P Adema 
"DNA Fingerprinting Evidence: The Road to Admissibility in California" [1989) 
26 San Diego LR 377, 378. 
11 There is no attempt to cover all the areas of law relevant to DNA profiling. 
The constitutional issues of privacy and self-incrimination which are raised in 
obtaining body samples by legitimate means, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
For an introduction to this topic, see N Levy "DNA fingerprinting: Justification 
for blood sampling by force ?" (1988) submitted for LLB(Honours) at Victoria 
University of Wellington, M G Sloan "The privilege against self-incrimination 
and real evidence: old women and hermits go fox hunting" (1990) LLM research 
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of understanding a complex science, as one of knowing the right 
questions to put to the experts. The discussion in this paper seeks to 
alert the legal community to the problematic aspects of DNA evidence 
through both a consideration of the scientific principles and an 
evaluation of the cases. In summary, it is an attempt to provide a 
response to the following quotation: 1 2 
The power of scientific evidence can be used to proper 
advantage only if it is evaluated with sufficient scientific 
literacy. If our law schools fail to address that subject, judges 
and [lawyers] should take it upon themselves to understand 
the rudiments of scientific method and the reasons why general 
acceptance on scientific question can be difficult to attain. 
Part II of this paper describes in basic terms the DNA profiling 
technique and how the results are interpreted. The potential 
applications and limitations of DNA technology are also considered. 
Part III begins with a brief discussion of the general principles of 
expert testimony in relation to scientific evidence. Then there is an 
examination of particular issues raised by the nature of DNA evidence, 
with a focus on the comprehension and admissibility of such evidence. 
In Part IV the main cases from various jurisdictions which pertain to 
the subject will be analysed. Part V concludes the discussion. 
While the focus of this paper is DNA, the sorts of problems 
encountered are common to evidence from all forensic sciences. This 
century has seen an exponential growth in the technology and 
insights offered by sciences such as fingerprinting, blood-grouping, 
chemical substance analysis, firearms examination and document 
examination.13 While such evidence can play a critical role in the 
paper at Victoria University of Wellington, and Compulsory Taking of Samples in 
Criminal Investigations (Auckland District Law Society Public Issues Committee, 
Auckland, November 1988). 
12 Thomas Some Observations by a Scientist (1986) (Symposium on Admission of 
Scientific Evidence), quoted in J J Barr "The Use of DNA Typing in Criminal 
Prosecutions: A Flawless Partnership of Law and Science ?" [1989) 34 NY 
University LR 485, 485. 
1 3 For a very brief introduction to these forensic sciences, see J H Phillips and J 
K Bowen Forensic Science and the Expert Witness (The Law Book Co. Ltd., 
5 
outcome of serious trials, by nature it is highly technical and easily 
misunderstood. Hence the way in which expert evidence is presented 
becomes extremely important. 
II, DNA PROFILING 
1, The Technique 
In 1985 Professor Alec Jeffreys, a geneticist of Leicester University 
in England developed the technique of DNA profilingl 4 . The basis of 
the procedure is that genetic material (DNA) is extracted from blood or 
other body tissue and reacted with a "probe" to produce a pattern of 
bands of stripes which is specific to that individual. 
Under the conditions of Professor Jeffreys' experiment, 1 5 the 
chance of two unrelated 1 6 people having identical profiles was 
roughly 30,000 million to one. Comparing the population of the world, 
which is approximately 5 billion 1 7, DNA profiling has a very strong 
power to discriminate between individuals. Under other methods the 
chance of a coincidental match has been asserted to be one in many 
mi 11 ions. 1 8 Thus under ideal conditions, DNA tests can be used to 
positively identify people and establish family relationships with 
virtual certainty. Herein lies its enormous potential for the law. 
Victoria, revised edition including appendix on genetic fingerprinting, 1989), 
part II. 
14 DNA itself was discovered long ago, although most scientific progress has 
been made in the last few decades. Since the 1970's DNA has been used in the 
study of human genetic diseases (e.g. cystic fibrosis), which is commonly 
referred to as DNA diagnostics. 
l 5 Reported in A J Jeffreys, V Wilson and S L Thein "Individual-specific 
'fingerprints' of human DNA" (1985) 316 Nature 76. Three different multi-locus 
probes were used on samples from a panel of 20 unrelated British Caucasians. 
l 6 Although not necessarily randomly selected. 
1 7 The world population in 1990 was estimated al 5,286 million: S J Young 
"Current Topic: DNA Evidence - Beyond Reasonable Doubt ?" (1991] Crim LR 264. 
l 8 The power of identification has been asserted to be one in 840 million and one 
in 140 million (Black Americans) (by Lifecodes in People v Wesley 140 Misc 2d 
306; 533 NYS2d 643 (albany CCt 1988), and even as high as one in a trillion, 
however many commentators believe these statistics are exaggerated: see 
generally J J Barr, above n 12, 488 and A Pearsall "DNA Printing: The 
Unexamined 'Witness' in Criminal Trials" (1989] 77 California LR 665, 668. 
6 
What follows in the next few sections is a brief background to the 
science and the testing procedures involved in DNA profiling. This 
treatment is very much a simplified overview for the lay reader. I 9 
1.1 What is DNA ? 
Almost every tissue and fluid in a person's body contains the 
substance deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). It is the genetic material 
contained in the nucleus of all living cells from which chromosomes 
are made. DNA 
individual unique. 
stores the genetic information which makes every 
According to some estimates, about 90 percent2 0 of 
genes are the same in all people, while the rest vary from person to 
person. Other estimates assert that about two thirds of human genes 
are the same.2 1 Either way, there is an almost inconceivably large 
number of combinations of genes in the human body. The only 
exception is the case of identical twins, who will have identical DNA. 
An individual inherits DNA from his or her parents, with 
approximately half being contributed by the mother and half by the 
father. While parents do not impart the same 50 percent of genes to 
each of their children, related people share a significant proportion of 
their DNA. It has been estimated that with siblings, 63 percent of their 
DNA profile bands would match.2 2 It is an important quality of DNA 
that it is the same throughout a person's body, and it remains the same 
throughout their life. 
l 9 This information is drawn from a number of sources designed for the non-
scientist, which should be consulted if a more comprehensive treatment is 
required: K F Kelly, J J Rankin and R C Wink "Method and Applications of DNA 
Fingerprinting: A Guide for the Non-Scientist" [1987] Crim LR 105, J J Barr, 
above n 12, W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 9, J C Hoeffel "The Dark Side of 
DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence meets the Criminal Defendant" 
[1990] 42 Stanford LR 465, L Beeler and W R Wiebe "DNA Identification Tests 
and the Courts" [1988] 63 Washington LR 903, I Freckleton, above n 2, J J D 
Greenwood and R M White "DNA Fingerprinting and the Law" [1988] 51 Modern 
LR 145, C M Tande "DNA Typing: A New Investigatory Tool" [1989] Duke LJ 474. 
20 J J Barr, above n 12 
2l J J D Greenwood and R M White, above n 19, 145 
22 P Macalister "From fingerprints to genetic codes: Indisputable evidence ?" 
(1989) Law Society Journal (Aust) 43, 45 
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DNA is composed of two long strands of alternating sugar and 
phosphate units. The strands arc linked by paired molecules called 
bases of which there are only four kinds, represented by the letters A, 
T, C and G. It is the particular sequence of these bases that is unique 
for every person and creates their genetic code. Each chromosome 
contains millions of pairs of bases. 
Repeated sequences are known as minisatellites and the number of 
repeats is characteristic of the individual. Allele is the genetic term 
which refers to the variations that occur in a region of DNA. The 
strands of DNA twist around each other in a spiral to form a double 
helix. The structure of DNA is said to look something like a twisted 
ladder. Alternatively, the sequence can be envisaged as a zipper in 
which the "teeth" only close when the bases are paired in a particular 
way (A-T, G-C). 
1.2 The Process of DNA Profi!io~ 
The technique for obtaining a DNA profile is a complex scientific 
procedure. It is a labour intensive process that requires meticulous 
expertise. The steps involved are set out here in summary form .2 3 
1. The starting point is obtaining a biological sample. With few 
exceptions,2 4 DNA can be extracted from any human body tissue or 
fluid. Most often a sample consists of blood, semen (with spermatoza), 
skin, or hair roots. 
2. Quite small quantities are said to be sufficient for DNA testing. 
Most authorities say that the tests can be done on smaller samples than 
those required for conventional bloodgrouping tests.25 Current DNA 
2 3 These steps are usefully summarised in diagramatic form by P Stringer and S 
Cordiner "DNA Profiling" (1989) 2 Family L Bulletin 10, 12, and by B Selinger 
and E Magnusson "The Scientific Basis of DNA Technology" in DNA and Criminal 
Justice: Conference Proceedings by J Vernon and B Selinger (eds) (Australian 
Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 1990, No. 2) (Conference held 30-31 October 
1989). 
24 Red blood cells (which do not have nucleii) are one of the few exceptions. 
Apparently over 90 percent of the cells in the human body contain DNA: J J Barr, 
above n 12, 494 (fn43). 
25 For example, see J J Barr, above n 12, 514. 
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technology requires something like a minimum of 50 microlitres (0.05 
millilitres) of blood, 10 microlitres of semen or 10 hair roots2 6, 
although larger samples will be taken if possible to ensure there is 
enough to perform the tests. There are, however, conflicting claims in 
some of the literature about the quantities required.2 7 
3. The DNA is extracted and purified by chemicals so that only 
DNA remains. If the sample is small it is common to use a technique to 
estimate how much DNA there is to work with. 
4. Next the DNA is treated with an enzyme known as a 
restriction enzyme (or restriction endonuclease). This cuts the DNA 
into fragments of different lengths at points where the enzyme 
recognises a particular base sequence or code. The scientist can 
control the regions which arc cut by using a certain enzyme. 
5. The fragments are placed in an agar gel so that they can be 
sorted by length. An electric current is run through the gel in a 
process called gel electrophoresis. The current causes the fragments 
to migrate down the gel towards the positive electrode, with the more 
mobile, shorter fragments moving faster than the longer ones. Thus 
the DNA fragments are arranged in bands throughout the gel 
according to their size or molecular weight. The DNA is invisible, but 
there are methods of checking that the sample has "run down the 
track properly" (e.g. using dye). 
6. Samples of DNA from different sources are run through the 
gel in lanes next to each other. It is normal for one of the lanes to be a 
control lane. This is a sample of DNA from a known, unrelated source, 
used as a comparison because its length, and the strength of its result 
for the particular probe used, is predetermined . 
7. The DNA is transferred to a nylon membrane by blotting it 
from the gel using a process known as Southern Blotting. The DNA 
26 I Frecktelton, above n 2, 28 
27 For example D Werrett and J Lygo say in "DNA Profiling" (1987) The Law 
Society's Gazette 3637, at 3638 that "[t]he amount required is much greater than 
for conventional tests". 
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fragments become fixed to the membrane, which is easier to work with 
than the gel. 
8. A probe (or a series of probes) is then applied to the 
membrane to detect regions of DNA that vary greatly between 
individuals. Probes are special pieces of DNA in a solution which has 
been pre-treated to make it radioactive. The probe will recognise a 
particular sequence of DNA bases (minisatellite), and bind (hybridise) 
to fragments of this sequence in the DNA pattern. 
probes act as markers. 
In this way the 
9. Next the membrane is placed against an X-ray film, and the 
radioactivity causes an image of bands to be recorded on the film. This 
stage normally takes several days, but can take up to several weeks. 
10. When the film is developed, the result 1s a picture 
(autoradiograph or autorad) which roughly resembles the barcode 
found on supermarket packaging.2 8 This is how an individual's 
unique DNA profile is recorded. 
The profiles from different DNA samples are now ready for the 
complex step of comparing the bands for identification and 
interpreting the results. 
1.3 Multi-locus probes and Sincte locus probes 
At present, there is no consensus or uniformity amongst the world's 
DNA laboratories as to the best type of probe to use. The two main 
categories of probes are called multi-locus probes and single locus 
probes. 2 9 
A single locus probe binds to only one particular sequence of DNA 
bases. It will produce a profile containing one or two bands only. If it 
reveals one band, it is most likely that the person inherited this same 
28 There are some realistic visual examples in J Lygo "Sharpening the Focus" 
(1991) 141 New LJ 448, and in D Werrett and J Lygo "The role of DNA Profiling 
in the Courts" (1989) The Law Society's Gazette 13:35 (5 April). 
29 A locus is the general term to describe a particular site on the DNA molecule. 
1 0 
allele from both parents. The advantage of using single locus probes is 
that they are highly sensitive and generally produce strong bands. 
Their disadvantage is that they produce relatively low discrimination, 
with results commonly being able to distinguish only one in hundreds. 
If there is enough DNA, this can be overcome by using a series of 
about 3 or 4 separate probes on the same sample and combining the 
results. 
Multi-locus probes bind to a number of base sequences that arc 
similar but not identical. They produce profiles composed of bands in a 
barcode pattern. The number of bands usually ranges between 15 and 
40, and not all of the bands will have the same intensity. The 
advantage of using multi-locus probes in that they provide more 
information per profile, and they can produce highly discriminatory 
information, often in the order of one in millions. Their disadvantage 
is that they are relatively insensitive compared to sin gle locus probes, 
and for this reason a larger amount of DNA is required. 
Sometimes it is possible to do repeated tests on the same sample of 
DNA, which would allow analysis with several different probes, and 
even a combination of multi-locus and single locus probes. The probe 
can be removed from the nylon membrane by washing in a process 
known as stripping . Unfortunately when the membrane is stripped, 
an amount of DNA will be lost, and therefore the sensitivity of the tests 
is reduced with each re-probing. 
With each set of DNA samples the scientist must assess which 
probes will produce the most effective result. This is heavily 
dependent on the quantities of the samples, the probes available to that 
laboratory, and whether they have adequate population data.3 0 
1,4 The Testing Laboratories 
DNA testing techniques are marketed by two main commercial 
laboratories. The patent for the multi-locus probe method developed 
30 Section 3.3, below p 26 
1 1 
by Dr Jeffreys is held by rcr3 1 in the United Kingdom, who formed 
Cellmark Diagnostics Corporation in 1987 to market the technique on a 
commercial basis. Soon afterwards Cellmark also began to operate 
through a subsidiary in the United States.3 2 The company have coined 
the term "DNA Fingerprinting" to describe the testing system. When 
Cellmark first opened they relied exclusively on multi-locus probes, 
but since early 1988 the company have used some single locus probes 
as well, particularly for criminal identification work. 
The other predominantly used test is a single locus probe method 
offered by Lifecodes Corporation in the United States33 since 1987. The 
patented term used by this company is the "DNA-Print Identification 
Test". Generally, up to four single locus probes are used to produce 
one or two bands each. Lifecodes' testing method has been widely used 
in the United States from the outset, while the Jeffreys muli-locus 
probes are said to have been "little employed in the USA" .3 4 
In addition to those two main testing methods, Cetus Corporation in 
the United States3 5 has developed a DNA test known as "Polymerase 
Chain Reaction" (PCR), or "DNA Amplification". This process is 
markedly different from the Lifecodes and Cellmark tests in the 
procedures used,3 6 and in the fact that it produces a pattern of dots 
from which an individual's genetic information can be determined. It 
has the advantage of requiring far less biological material than the 
other tests3 7 since the amount of DNA is "amplified". However, in 
3 l Imperial Chemical Industries, a multi-national chemical and pharmaceutical 
company. 
3 2 Cellmark Diagnostics is now based in Adingdon, Oxfordshire in England, and 
Germantown, Maryland in the United States. 
33 Lifecodes is based in Valhalla, New York. 
34 Paper by Dr A R Bellamy (9/11/90), received in correspondence with Dr P 
Stapleton, below n 44. 
35 Cetus Corporation is based in Emeryville, California. 
36 The Lifecodcs and Cellmark techniques arc classified as restriction fragment 
length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis, while the PCR technique is an allele-
specific probe analysis. For detailed discussion on the difference between these 
procedures, sec W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 9, 64-79 and J J Barr, above n 
12, 497-508. 
37 It is said that the Cetus test can type a single hair root or as few as 40 sperm 
heads, (compared to several thousand sperm heads required by other tests): 
Higuchi, von Beroldingen, Sensabaugh and Erlich "DNA Typing from Single Hairs" 
(1988) 322 Nature 543, cited by W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 9, 50. 
1 2 
comparison this test produces less specific results, and relies ·on 
technology which is "newer and perhaps less widely accepted. "3 8 
The technique used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) m 
the United States39 is also "unique". The probes it uses are a blend of 
probes drawn from those used by the other private laboratories. 
Profiling" is the term used by the FBI. 
"DNA 
As molecular biology advances, other methods of DNA profiling 
are sure to be developed. Forensic scientists have already begun 
experimenting with a new approach to testing using a laser 
sequencing technique.4 0 
In New Zealand, DNA testing for the police, along with most other 
forensic investigation work,41 is presently carried out by the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). The DNA 
probes discovered by Jeffreys arc among those that the DSIR presently 
use. Research currently being undertaken by their DNA technicians 
should enable greater use of single locus probes in the near future 
The DSIR are also working on the introduction of DNA amplification 
technology, so as to make their tests more sensitive. 
The Jeffreys method is also applied by the police scientific 
laboratories in the United Kingdom,42 including the Home Office 
Forensic Science Service with which the New Zealand DSIR Chemistry 
Division has close connections. The Home Office have recently begun 
to use single locus probes as well, since population data has become 
38 W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 9, 50. 
39 The FBI has established its Forensic Science and Research Training Centre in 
Quantico, Virginia. See K W Nimmich "Structure of the FBI Laboratory" in DNA 
and Criminal Justice: Conference Proceedings, above n 23, at 85 on the FBI's 
research programme. FBI casework analysis began in December 1988. 
4 0 See J J Barr, above n 12, 493 (fn 36) for details. 
4 1 Apart from conventional fingerprinting, which has long been a specialised 
branch of police work. 
42 The Central Research and Support Establishment of the Home Office Forensic 
Science Service (at Aldermaston), the Metropolitan Forensic Science Laboratory 
(in London) and the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory. 
1 3 
available. State Forensic Laboratories in Australia use the Lifecodes 
testing method.4 3 
There are four private testing laboratories available to conduct tests 
for civil disputes in New Zealand.4 4 
i) DNA Diagnostics Ltd, which was the first private laboratory to 
offer testing here, operates within the School of Medicine at Auckland 
University.45 Their DNA profiling service uses the Jeffreys probes as 
well as a combination of single locus probes. DNA Diagnostics does not 
conduct conventional bloodgrouping tests on the samples they 
analyse. 
ii) The Auckland Regional Blood Transfusion Centre, have 
performed conventional blood tests for parentage disputes for many 
years, and continue to do so . They announced the availability of DNA 
technology early in 1990. 
iii) The Otago Regional Blood Transfusion Centre, began 
performing DNA profiling early in 1991, in addition to well-established 
conventional blood testing. 
iv) Genetic Technologies Corporation, situated in New South 
Wales, Australia, is the appointed licensee of Lifecodes Corporation for 
Australia and New Zealand. 
These private laboratories charge somewhere around NZ$1000 for a set 
of tests on three individuals. 
4 3 See D Gidley "DNA Profiling: The Transition from Watching Brief to the Courts 
-a Victorian perspective" in DNA and Criminal Justice: Conference Proceedings, 
above n 23, at 97, for a comment on why they adopted the Lifecodes method. 
Their DNA profiling casework service began in July 1989. 
44 Contacts for correspondence are: 
(i) Dr P Stapleton, Technical Manager, DNA Diagnostics Ltd, PO Box 5739, 
Auckland. 
(ii) Dr J M Faed, Director, Otago RBTC (Dunedin Hospital). 
(iii) Dr D G Woodfield, Medical Director, Auckland RTBC (Auckland Hospital). 
(iv) M Jones, Marketing Director, Genetic Technologies Corp. (Artarmon, NSW 
2064). 
45 In fact it is joint venture of Auckland Uniservices and Diagnostics Laboratory 
Holdings Ltd. 
14 
2, A Comparison with ConveotiooaJ Tests 
Until the development of DNA profiling, blood sample testing was 
limited to several bloodgrouping systems based on some principal ways 
in which the blood of one human can differ from another. These 
are: 4 6 
i) The "ABO" blood grouping system, which tests blood cell 
membranes for the presence or absence of antigens A and B.4 7 This 
system is the oldest of conventional testing methods, and also the most 
important for forensic purposes because it is capable of being detected 
in dried bloodstains. The "HLA" system is another antigen-testing 
method. 
ii) Systems which indicate antibodies and proteins present in 
the blood scrum, such as the Hp protein. 
iii) Systems which classify different enzymes found in blood 
cells. Examples are the PGM, AK, and EAP classification systems. 
iv) Tests on other body fluids such as perspiration, saliva, 
vaginal secretions, and semen to determine whether the individual 
secretes antigens into these fluids.4 8 
It is often said that conventional blood grouping methods have only 
ever been able to exclude a particular person as a putative criminal or 
biological parent, not positively identify them. 
statement is an example.4 9 
The following 
4 6 See J H Phillips and J K Bowen, above n 23, eh 6, or J H Phillips "Genetic 
Fingerprinting" [1988) 62 Aust. LJ 550. The figures quoted in the next two 
footnotes, taken from those sources, are estimates for the Australian population, 
although the New Zealand population is expected to be very similar. 
4 7 About 46% of the population belong to blood group "O"(antigens A and B both 
absent), 38% to group "A" (antigen A present, B absent), 13% to group 
"B "(antigen B present, A absent), and 3% to group "AB "(both antigens present). 
48 About 78% of the population are secretors. 
49 S J Cordiner and P Stringer "Getting into your genes" (1986) 1 Family L 
Bulletin 82, 82 
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Current methods of characterising such body fluid stains are 
limited in that they only allow the scientist to say that the stain 
could have come from a certain percentage of the New Zealand 
population, never that it came from a particular person. 
By way of comparison, claims have been made that DNA profiling 
"[has] the advantage of providing positive proof of paternity"5 0, and 
that "the discriminating power of the technique is such that positive 
associations can be made. ,,5 1 
In fact the concepts of conventional blood testing and DNA 
profiling arc not fundamentally different, even if the details of the 
testing procedures are. The essential difference between them is in 
the magnitude of the identification statistics that result. What DNA 
technology offers is not absolute proof of identity, but results which 
can approach such a high level of accuracy that they are said to 
produce virtual certainty, or "nearly positive identificaton. ,,5 2 
Perhaps then, DNA tests are best regarded as simply another type of 
blood testing, albeit potentially much more sensitive. This is the 
precise question that has recently come before a Family Court Judge 
for determination in a paternity case.5 3 
Conversely, others would prefer to sec conventional blood tests as a 
type of DNA testing. 5 4 An argument can be made that conventional 
blood tests arc indirect tests of DNA, since the characteristics of cells 
and tissues that they are designed to test are actually determined by 
50 S Maidment "DNA Fingerprinting" (1986) 1 Family L Bulletin 83, 83 
51 P Stringer and S Cordiner, above n 23, 10 
52 C M Tande, above n 19, 480 
5 3 T v S, above n 6. The mother made a formal application under section 55 of 
the Family Proceedings Act 1980 for further paternity tests to be done, after 
conflicting results were obtained from earlier DNA and blood typing tests 
performed by Auckland Regional Blood Transfusion Services. This Family Court 
hearing concerned the preliminary issue of whether DNA tests arc in fact blood 
tests within the meaning of sections 54-59 of the Family Proceedings Act. A 
DSIR scientist gave evidence at the hearing that a DNA test is a type of blood test. 
5 4 This view is held by J M Faed and A E Knight "Testing for Paternity" (Otago 
Regional Blood Transfusion Centre, Dunedin, 7 December 1990), 2. 
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DNA. Under this analysis, the new DNA profiling tests are a direct way 
of testing DNA characteristics. 
In forensic science, bloodgrouping tests are just one type of 
evidence that has traditionally been used to connect a suspect with 
some crime. Any number of samples of biological and chemical "trace 
material"55 might be retrieved from the crime scene, or from victims 
and suspects. The forensic biologist may, for exmple, be asked to 
identify and differentiate hairs, fibres, or other body fluid stains such 
as saliva. The same evaluative principles behind DNA profiling and 
bloodgrouping methods also apply to these other sorts of evidence. 
Depending on the nature of the particular biological material, the 
discriminating power of the statistical result may be of great probative 
value, very little, or none at all. 
Conventional fingerprint evidence5 6 is a specialised analysis of 
"trace material", but again the underlying principles are not really 
any different. It has been estimated that the number of possible 
fingerprint patterns is 64 billion5 7, hence fingerprint comparisons 
have acquired the "colloquial specificity of absolute identification ... 5 8 
It is no doubt because of this high power of individualisation that the 
term "DNA fingerprinting" has been used to describe the new DNA 
technology at times. 
The main thing that does differentiate fingerprint evidence from 
DNA profiling5 9 is the way in which the evidence is normally 
5 5 The relevance of all forensic scientific evidence theoretically arises from the 
age-old "contact trace" principle from Locard, that any two objects in contact will 
leave some trace. 
5 6 For an introduction to fingerprint analysis and its historical background, see 
J H Phillips and J K Bowen, above n 13, eh 8. 
57 But note that estimates of the probability of two people have identical 
fingerprints vary according to the classification system used: see B W N 
Robertson "Fingerprints, Relevance and Admissibility" [1990) NZ Recent LR 252, 
254. 
58 D A Stoney "What made us ever think we could 
statistics?" (1991) J Forensic Science Society 197, 197. 
individualise using 
59 It is worth noting a further difference between these two sorts of evidence 
which has recently been argued. D A Stoney, idem, points out that while the 
process of comparing fingerprints is "explicity a subjective process", DNA 
profiling is based on the more objective "step-wise" disciplines of population 
genetics and statistics. Having said that however, he acknowledges that there is 
I 7 
presented. Fingerprint experts speak in terms of a "number of points 
of comparison", while the other evidence is generally given as a 
probability or likelihood. This distinction is largely historical, and its 
desirability has recently been questioned.6 0 
3. Interpretioe DNA Results 
There are two necessary steps in comparing the profiles from 
different DNA samples. The first is matching bands, and the second is 
explaining the results in statistical terms. It is not meaningful to 
perform one step without the other. This may seem very elementary. 
but more than one Judge has managed to surprise in a DNA case by 
admitting evidence of only one of the steps. 
3,1 Matchine bands 
The profiles produced m laboratories rarely have the crisp, clean 
appearance of the familiar supermarket barcode with which they are 
likened. Especially for multi-locus profiles, the bands arc often 
smudgy, smeared or faint, making it difficult to determine where one 
band starts and another ends. 
In criminal investigation work, the band matching task is often 
made particularly difficult by a blurry or faint appearance of bands in 
DNA profiles, caused by an insufficient quantity of sample. Samples 
that are contaminated or degraded can also result 
might cause bands to be missing or extra 
in smearing, or they 
bands to appear. 6 1 
Contamination by the presence of bacteria or organic material can 
still some human judgment involved, and that DNA profiling cannot lead us 
through to "absolute identifications". 
6 0 B W N Robertson has suggested that the preferable approach with regard to 
fingerprints is for the evidence to be given in both forms, ie. for the "number of 
points of comparison to be accompanied by evidence ... as to its probabilistic 
effect": see above n 57, at 257, in a comment on New Zealand's leading fingerprint 
evidence case (R v Buisson & Ratana [1990] 2 NZLR 542 (CA)). 
61 There is some debate amongst scientists about how common it is for "extra" 
bands to appear as a result of contamination-type problems. It has been pointed 
out that: "the aberrations are far more likely to make matching DNA prints look 
different than to make different DNA prints look the same." However, extra 
bands have been known to appear before. See W C Thompson and S Ford "Is DNA 
fingerprinting ready for the Courts ?" (1990) New Scientist 20 (31 March),23. 
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occur at any stage of the DNA testing process, or during collection and 
handling of the samples6 2, or commonly before collection if the 
specimen is from the scene of a crime. 
There is also a phenomenon known as "band shift", in which 
samples from the same individual produce similar DNA prints, but with 
the bands out of alignment. This is caused by a different migration rate 
of DNA in different lanes during gel electrophoresis, which has been 
attributed to a number of factors. 6 3 The important point for present 
purposes is the established fact that band shifting can occur even if 
the various lanes contain DNA from the same individual. So the 
scientist must look to see if a non-alignment was uniform. Practices 
adopted to overcome these sorts of problems obviously add a significant 
element of subjectivity to the interpretation of results. 
(a) Criminal Identification 
The bands produced by different samples on an autorad should 
theoretically be in identical positions if the samples come from the 
same source. Thus 111 forensic investigation, the technician is 
attempting to establish band "matches". 
comparison and precise measurement. 
Decisions are based on visual 
Mechanical measuring devices 
are available, but their reliability is not yet widely accepted. 
In the case of single locus probe analysis, two bands are 
traditionally declared a match if they are within a specified distance or 
standard deviation of each other, which is known as the binning 
approach. This method of declaring matches leads to a definite cut-off 
point, outside which a band is a non-match. No allowance is made for 
"close matches". Tiny differences in band positions could tilt the 
evidence from incriminating to excluding. This is, of course, of great 
concern when one considers the possibilities of complications such as 
"band shift". 
6 2 See generally, T Sargant and P Hill Criminal Trials: the Search for the Truth 
(Fabian Society, London, 1986) (Fabian Research Series No. 348). 
63 See P J Neufeld and N Colman "When Science Takes the Witness Stand" (1990) 
262:5 Scientific American 18, 23, and E S Lander "Invited Editorial: Research on 
DNA Typing Catching up with Courtroom Application" (1991) 48 Am. J Human 
Genetics 819. 
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This problem of declaring matches and non-matches has been 
highlighted by several authors. 6 4 As a solution, scientists and 
statisticians from Britain and New Zealand65 have recently devised a 
way of assessing the quality of a match. The position of the bands is 
treated as a continuous variable under this method. Thus the value of 
the evidence, or the "match", becomes progressively stronger as the 
bands come closer together. 
In the writer's view, the continuous model of establishing band 
matches seems to be preferable to a "matching rule" in logical terms. 
But the approach is relatively new and has not been extensively 
reviewed in the literature. Furthermore, extensive "properly 
designed"66 studies have been recently carried out m the United 
States, which support and validate the use of the fixed bin method of 
declaring matches. On the basis of these studies, the FBI have collated 
a massive database to be used to interpret the significance of bands 
that "match".67 
With multi-locus probes, where there are a greater number of 
bands 111 each profile, the comparison will be mostly visual. The 
intensities and overall pattern of the bands is as important here as the 
distances between corresponding bands . All the bands in the scene 
sample must be present in the su spect's profile, otherwise most 
laboratories will declare a non-match . Remember that the scene 
sample profile is likely to be of poorer quality than the profiles of 
individuals that it is being compared with . 
64 Discussed in J Lygo, above n 28, 448. Another useful summary of the problem 
is in I W Evett "Evaluation of DNA Profiles: sense and nonsense" (1991) J 
Forensic Science Society 205. 
65 J Lygo, idem, I W Evett, idem, and J Bucklcton, C M Triggs and K A J Walsh 
"An approach to the interpretation of DNA locus specific work based on a 
continuous model for the position of DNA bands" (DSIR, Auckland, 1991) 
(Publication in the J Forensic Science Society forthcoming). 
6 6 E S Lander, above n 63, 820. He asserts that they are the "first properly 
designed studies to support a matching rule". 
67 B Budowle, A M Giusti, J S Waye et al, "Fixed-Bin Analysis for Statistical 
Evaluation of Continuous Distributions of Allelic Data from VNTR Loci, for Use in 
Forensic Comparisons" (1991) 48 Am. J Human Genetics 841, and B Budowle et 
al (FBI) "A Preliminary Report on Binned General Population Data on Six VNTR 
Loci in Caucasians, Blacks and Hispanics from the United States (1991) 18:1 
Crime Laboratory Digest 10. 
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It is a moot point whether two multi-locus profiles must be 
absolutely identical to be of any probative value as evidence. Many 
scientists hold that it is in the nature of laboratory testing that results 
will hardly ever be exactly identical. If this is so, then:6 8 
an expert who insists that DNA prints be identical in all respects 
before declaring that they match, will miss a lot of matches ... 
the cutoff point for declaring a match must be at some level 
short of a perfect correlation. 
It must be acknowledged that this method of matching multi-locus 
probes is highly conservative. In theory it should be possible to devise 
a mathematical model which assesses the quality of a match for each 
multi-locus profile band similar to the one described above for single 
locus probes. Such a model, which would be extremely complicated, 
has not yet been designed. 
(b) Parentage 
If the DNA tests instead seek to establish a relationship, the 
technician examines whether a child's profile can be obtained by 
combining the bands from each of the parents' profiles. Despite this 
fundamental difference, the process of declaring band matches 
between profiles is based on essentially the same principles. 
Quantity and quality of the samples do not tend to cause any 
problems in issues of parentage since adequate samples can usually be 
taken at any time. There are, however, exceptions, such as the need to 
establish a relationship for the crime of incest. 
3.2 Statistics 
The outcome of a DNA test is expressed as the probability or chance 
of a coincidental match, or in other words, the likelihood that by 
chance another randomly selected individual will have exactly the 
68 J J Barr, above n 12, 516 (quoting from Thompson and Ford). 
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same DNA pattern. The actual statistics can vary greatly from test to 
test since they depend upon which probes and enzymes are used, as 
well as the quality of the samples. 
It follows from what was said earlier, that the finding of a "match" 
in forensic science is, on its own, a piece of misleading and 
meaningless evidence. It can only make any sense if the chance of a 
match in the general population is compared. One of the few 
commentators to have enunciated this states:6 9 
A match is only significant, however, if one knows how often 
two people's profiles match by chance. To make that 
calculation, scientists must know how often a particular profile 
occurs in the population. 
What sort of statistical analysis is used to achieve this comparison ? 
The Bayesian approach provides a widely recognised and useful basis 
for the statistical assessment of evidence in forensic science.70 Bayes 
rule describes how probability changes on the receipt of new 
information, and it can be used to quantify the presentation of 
evidence. Bayesian probability theory is based on the ability to 
quantify uncertainty. This means that if all pieces of evidence were 
able to be ascribed a mathematical probability, Bayes rule could 
produce a final estimate of the probability of criminal guilt, for 
example. Of course human intuition does not quantify most pieces of 
evidence with numerical precision. Forensic evidence is perhaps an 
exception. Even so, "Bayes theorem still reproduces qualitatively just 
what your common sense tells you". 7 1 
69 C Joyce "High profile: DNA in Court again" (1990) New Scientist (21 July), 10 
[own emphasis] 
7 0 Support for this approach can be found in J Lygo, above n 28 (and the citations 
therein), J Buckleton, C M Triggs and K A J Walsh, above n 65, M O Finkelstein 
and W B Fairly "The Continuing Debate over Mathematics in the Law of Evidence" 
(1971) 84 Harvard L R 1801, S E Fi en berg and M J Schervish "The Relevance of 
Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal 
Decisionmaking" (1986] 66 Boston LR 771, I W Evett "What is the probability 
that this blood came from that person ? A meaningful question ?" (1983) 23 J 
Forensic Science Society 35, and I W Evett "Bayesian inference and forensic 
science: problems and perspectives" (1987) 36 The Statistician 99. 
71 E T Jaynes Probability Theory - the Logic of Science (Washington, draft 1991) 
(Publication forthcoming), at 113 
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In mathematical terms, Bayes theorem states: 
P(G/E) 
P(G/E) 
= P(E/G) 
P(E/G) 
X P(G) 
P(G) 
where G = guilt and E = evidence. The first component, an assessment of 
the probability of guilt compared to the probability of non-guilt 
(innocence), is the business of the court. The third component is the 
court's previous or prior assessment of guilt before the new piece of 
evidence (E) was received. The second component 1s known as the 
likelihood ratio of the present piece of evidence, stated as a ratio of 1 to 
some other number. This is the concern of the expert witness. 
The application of the Bayesian approach to legal decisionmaking is 
not without criticism.7 2 An alternative mode of analysis is offered by 
a contrasting school of statistics known as the frequcntist approach. 
Mathematically, this requires an estimated frequency stated within 
some level of confidence. Often the results produced by this analysis 
will be the same as those from the Bayesian likelihood ratio, but not 
always. 
Specifically in relation to DNA profiling for criminal investigation 
work, the likelihood ratio is widely considered to be a very useful way 
of analysing and presenting the evidence. DNA results arc now 
interpreted using this method by the New Zealand DSIR, and also by 
the Home Office, as the result of organisation policy decisions.? 3 
Unfortunately the giving of evidence in cases of paternity has not 
been so uniform . 
7 2 Much debate has been generated about the relevance of different mathematical 
models to the law of evidence. A chief critic of the Bayesian approach is L H 
Tribe "Trial By Mathematics: Precision . and Ritual in the Legal Process'' (1971) 
84 Harvard LR 1329. Others are mentioned in S E Fienberg and M J Schervish, 
above n 70, which is a useful pro-Bayes article which summarises the main 
objections to Bayes theorem and attempts to address the critics. 
7 3 Interestingly, and by way of contrast, the DSIR has always presented 
traditional bloodgrouping evidence in frequentist terms. 
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It is suggested in this paper that the likelihood ratio is indeed a very 
useful form of interpreting and presenting DNA evidence. Several 
general reasons can be given for this.7 4 It can help the expert 
identify all the relevant issues, and it can also help the court to 
properly understand the evidence and combine it with all the other 
evidence in the case. Exactly why this is so should become clearer in 
the next few sections, where the nature of the actual statistical 
calculations on the basis of Bayes rule will be briefly outlined. 
The likelihood ratio specifically requires the expert witness in a 
criminal case, for instance, to consider the probability of "these" DNA 
bands (E = evidence) given that the stain comes from the suspect (C = 
contact) 7 5, divided by the probability of the bands (E) given that the 
stain does not come from the suspect (C). 
P(E/C) 
P(E/C) 
(a) Crim in al Tdenti fication 
(i) Single locus probes 
The likelihood ratio of Bayes Theorem is directly useful for 
interpreting DNA profiles from single locus probes. 
The Numerator 
At first sight, the probability of th e evidence given contact by this 
accused is expected to be 1 if it represents a "match", and O if it 
represents a "non-match". However, the practical problem of band 
shift, which has already been raised, is likely to cause small 
differences in position between corresponding bands, even between 
7 4 The reasons which follow are suggested by B Robertson and A Vignaux "A 
Bayesian in the Witness Box" (Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the New 
Zealand Statistical Association, Wellington, 28-30 August 1991) (Publication 
forthcoming). Giving evidence in the form of likelihood ratios is canvassed in 
more detail later: section 5.5, below p 39. 
7 5 Scientists prefer to replace G with C = contact, since it is not their job to 
consider guilt. 
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two profiles from the same individual. The method described above 7 6 
for calculating the quality of a match, is designed to remedy this 
problem. If that model is used, then the numerator of this ratio will 
not be exactly 1 in most cases of a "match", but something close to 1. 
The further apart two corresponding bands, the smaller the 
numerator, and the smaller the likelihood ratio for the DNA evidence. 
But this new model of analysis has not been universally adopted. 
Hence the traditional match/non-match ideology that derives from the 
binning method is still frequently encountered in written works. 
Consider this statement for instance: 7 7 
If, by comparison, a sample obtained from a suspect matches, 
then there will be a probability closely approximating 100% 
that the samples came from the same individual. 
can be safely assumed to indicate the contrary. 
The Denominator 
A non-match 
The denominator requires the probability of the evidence given 
that the stain does not come from the suspect. In other words, it is 
assumed that it could have come from "anybody else". Thus the chance 
of the profile originating from a randomly selected member of the 
population usually needs to be considered. Such data can only be 
obtained from population surveys. The rarer the bands in the DNA 
profile, the lower the denominator, and the higher the likelihood 
ratio. 
The population that the accused is being compared with should not 
necessarily be the whole population. If it is only a subset, this might 
mean that different population data applies, and it should affect the 
court's understanding of the likelihood ratio. 
The issue of which database to use m a given case appears to cause 
some confusion. It is submitted that a comparison with some subset of 
7 6 Section 3.1, above p 18 
77 J H Phillips and J K Bowen, above n 13, 110 
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the general population should only be made when the inquiry has 
revealed some reason to do so. The point is aptly stated by Evett in this 
way:78 
There is evidence that some practitioners believe that the 
relevant population is that to which the suspect belongs. This is 
wrong ... the most appropriate database is determined by the 
circumstances of the offence. 
Thus if there was an eyewitness who testifies that the perpetrator was 
a Maori, then the frequency of finding a particular DNA profile band 
amongst the Maori population becomes relevant. In the absence of 
this sort of connection to the incident, there is no logical reason why a 
particular accused's DNA profile (even if a Maori) should be compared 
with anything except the general population.? 9 
It is therefore necessary, for reasons of clarity, to state the 
hypothesis represented by the denominator of the likelihood ratio, in 
positive and specific terms. 
Experts should neither inflexibly nor covertly assume a 
particular alternative hypothesis, but should be able to give 
evidence on the basis of the alternative hypothesis appropriate 
to the particular case. 8 0 
(ii) Multilocus probes 
From population studies, the chance of any one multi-locus profile 
band occurring in another randomly selected person's profile is 
estimated to be 0.26 or slightly less. 8 1 That is, approximately 1 chance 
7 8 I W Evett, above n 64, 206. Also see J S Bucklcton, I W Evett and K A J Walsh 
"Who is 'random man' ?" (DSIR, Auckland, and Home Office, United Kingdom, 
1991) (Publication in J Forensic Science Society forthcoming), at 4. 
7 9 The definition of the correct target population is also a major issue in 
frequentist analysis: see C Kingston "A Perspective on Probability and Physical 
Evidence" (1989) 34 J Forensic Sciences 1336. 
80 B Robertson and A Vignaux, above n 74 
81 The figure of 0.26 was originally devised by A R Jeffreys, J F Y Brookfield and 
R Semeonoff in "Positive identification of an immigration test-case using human 
DNA fingerprints" (1985) 317 Nature 818. It has been validated in New Zealand 
26 
in 4. The chance of two bands matching is therefore82 0.26 x 0.26 (or 
0.26 2 ), which gives a ratio of 1 in 15. The chance of three bands 
matching, 0.26 X 0.26 X 0.26, is 1 in 59, and so on. This derives the 
formula, 
where 
marker 
x = the number of bands that match above a certain height 
accepted way of on the profiles. This has become an 
calculating the likelihood ratio for multi-locus probe profiles. Notice 
that the single formula incorporates both the numerator and the 
denominator of the Bayesian ratio. 8 3 
(b) Parentage 
The approach to interpreting DNA results in paternity or other 
parentage testing has been greatly influenced by the way in which 
conventional bloodtesting evidence is assessed. Generally the analysis 
is divided into two stages. Apparently, however, the methods used in 
New Zealand for statistical analysis of paternity results differ between 
laboratories. 8 4 
At the first stage, the percentage of random males who are excluded 
from paternity is calculated. This is derived from the results of tests on 
the mother, the child, and the general population. This statistic 
provides a critical indicator of the "ability of the set of tests to exclude 
males who are not the true father."8 5 
Where an alleged father is not excluded from paternity, a second 
calculation and a test of the putative father is required. This is the 
by a DSIR study: F J Hamilton, S J Cordiner and G K Chambers "A Survey of Band 
Sharing in the New Zealand Population with Multi-locus probe 33.15" (September 
1990, DSIR, Report No Cd). 0.26 is the most conservative figure in use. DNA 
Diagnostics Ltd use the statistic 0.25 as the band sharing ratio that exists 
between unrelated people, which is still a highly conservative figure: 
correspondence with Dr P Stapleton, above n 44. 
8 2 Assuming independence: see section 3.4, below p 28. 
8 3 Although it does assume that the probability of a match always = 1. 
84 J M Faed and A E Knight, above n 54, 1 
8 5 J M Faed and A E Knight, above n 54, 8 
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chance or probability for paternity of that particular man. The 
common alternative ways of presenting this result are either as: 
or 
i) an odds ratio (eg. 1 in 83), 
ii) a paternity index (eg. 83), 
iii) a probability or percentage chance for paternity 
(eg. 98.8 %86) 
While the probability for paternity is, at the moment, the most 
common mode of expression, there is a growing body of opinion which 
supports the giving of DNA and blood test evidence in parentage cases 
in the form of odds ratios. 8 7 
A third statistic which is sometimes quoted is the chance for a 
random male to father the child in question. Concern has been 
expressed by some members of the medical profession88 that this is not 
a reliable indicator of the proportion of all males who could father a 
child with the same test results. 
3.3 Population Data 
DNA studies have often established that the frequency of particular 
bands being shared in the population varies between ethnic groups. 
This is particularly true of the highly sensitive single locus probe 
bands.89 Some alleles are much more common in some groups than in 
86 If the likelihood ratio is assigned the value x, this percentage is calculated: 
_x_ x 100 e.g. U = 98.8% 
x+l 84 
87 See section 5.5, below p40, where the reasons for this preference are 
discussed. 
8 8 J M Faed and A E Knight, above n 54, 8. The main reason for concern is that 
the stastistic effectively combines these 2 pieces of evidence: 
(a) The chance that a random male will not be excluded from paternity of the 
child born to the mother in question, and 
(b) The chance that a non-excluded man could have produced this particular 
child, out of all the possible children he could have fathered with the mother in 
question. 
8 9 The overall band sharing frequency has been found to vary from 0.17 to 0.24 
amongst New Zealand's major ethnic groups (Caucasians, Maoris, Pacific Islanders 
and Asians), although this variation was not found to be statistically significant: 
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others. How might this variation affect the DNA statistics ? If a 
suspect is compared against their ethnic group, the likelihood ratio 
will probably decrease, because the denominator is likely to be higher 
if the bands are more common. 
Small sub-populations which have a degree of interbreeding will 
also exhibit certain bands which arc more common than m the 
general population, making general data inapplicable. Differences in 
band frequency have even been found to exist between two large 
American citics.90 In reality, most sub-populations would contain a 
very low degree of interbreeding, because it is well known that 
"people do not pick their partners randomly."91 However, the 
statistical impact of this is not likely to be serious, if noticeable at all.9 2 
If anything, the results should err on the side of conservativeness if 
general population data is used. 
The New Zealand DNA testing laboratories appear to be strongly 
aware of the need to work only with adequate and relevant databases. 
For example the DSIR, in collaboration with DNA Diagnostics, have 
spent considerable time in producing a database for the statistical 
analysis of single locus probes. Information has had to be gathered 
for each racial group. This should be completed in the not too distant 
future, allowing much more reliance to be placed on single locus 
probe analysis here.9 3 
Another hurdle in the collection of appropriate data is the expense 
and difficulty of large scale population studies. There is always a 
possibility that the data put forward in DNA evidence may be based on 
small samples, or it could be "borrowed" from other ill-fitted groups. 
Just what the size of an adequate population sample is, has no simple 
F J Hamilton, S J Cordiner and G K Chambers, above n 81. Hence the 0.26x 
formula for multi-locus probes is said not to be affected by race. 
90 W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 61, 25, comparing Miami and Houston. 
9 l C Joyce, above n 69, 10 
9 2 C Joyce, above n 69, canvasses the debate about whether arguments over 
statistics amount to "hairsplitting". 
93 It has, however, been suggested by DNA Diagnostics, above n 44, that: 
Because the population of New Zealand is small, and some groups 
represented here are indeed quite tiny, it may not be possible to 
establish an entirely satisfactory database for single locus probes. 
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answer. Many experiments are based on samples smaller than 100 
p e op 1e,9 4 but what is really important must be the number of 
comparisons that are made within that sample.9 5 
Strictly speaking, whatever method is used for declaring a match in 
an individual case, should be precisely the same as that used in the 
population data being applied. In the same vein, it is possible to object 
to DNA evidence if ethnic group data has been collected on the basis of 
potitical and social ethnic definition, but the reason the data is 
applicable to the circumstances is because of an eyewitness account of 
the perpetrator's appearance. 
weaknesses in population data. 
be paid to this comment:9 6 
These are further problems that create 
Having pointed them out, heed should 
3.4 
Even though the perfect survey is never available, the scientist 
should not despair. It is better to have some data available than 
none at all, and by using good judgment it will often be possible 
to modify existing survey data to compensate for the case 
variables. 
The Product Rule 
The chance of a coincidental match on one test can be combined by 
a simple multiplication with the results of another, to produce an 
overall statistic, if the bands are independent. A clear example of the 
use of this rule, called the product rule, is the basis of the calculation 
of a single likelihood statistic for multi-locus DNA results. 
are independent if:9 7 
The bands 
94 The study by F J Hamilton, S J Cordiner and G K Chambers, for example, above 
n 81, had a sample size of 118 people. 
9 5 Hence quite small samples might be sufficient. Note that the study by A J 
Jeffreys, V Wilson and S L Thein, above n 15, (which pioneered DNA profiling), 
was based on a sample of only 20 British Caucasians. That would probably be an 
adequate survey if they were exhaustively cross-checked, but apparently each 
sample was only compared to one or two others: see W C Thompson and S Ford, 
above n 9, 83. 
96 J S Buckleton, I W Evett and K A J Walsh, above n 78, 7 
9? W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 9, 81 
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the probability of a match on each band is unaffected by the 
occurrence of a match on any other band. 
The application of the product rule is, however, not valid if the 
alleles are not independent because of some correlation between their 
existence. The same considerations about interbreeding and randomly 
mixed populations apply here.9 8 In the absence of data to the 
contrary, independence of the probability of a band matching has 
generally been assumed to exist. This has been called into serious 
question by some commentators,9 9 although more experiments 
verifying the independence of the alleles detected by specific probes 
are being conducted. Again, it can be argued that the statistical impact 
of some very low, unknown correlation between DNA bands is not 
likely to be serious. 
4. The Impact of DNA ProfiJin~ io the Law 
4,1 AppJjcatioos 
(a) Criminal 
The impact that DNA evidence may have in serious criminal cases is 
indisputable. The potential ability of this highly sensitive new 
technology to positively link a suspect to a crime by body samples, has 
already been mentioned. In addition, DNA profiling offers some new 
possibilities in forensic applications. The tests are especially useful in 
rape and sexual abuse cases, since semen from the victim's swab can 
be separated out to produce an individual profile. DNA profiling can 
be used in relation to serial offenders and multiple crime scenes, 
enabling police to determine the number and identity of different 
perpetrators involved. The technique can also be used to identify the 
remains of victims. And most importantly, DNA can exculpate wrongly 
accused suspects. 
98 The condition of independence and random mixing 1s called Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium. 
99 W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 9, 83 and J J Barr, above n 12, 505. 
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Another advantage of DNA profiling in forensic work is the range 
of body samples that can be tested, depending on the nature of the 
investigation. Potential samples include whole blood, dried blood, 
semen stains, skin, hair roots, bone marrow, dental pulp, amniotic 
fluid, a foetus, and vaginal swabs. With less frequency, DNA tests may 
be done on urine, saliva and sweat. I O 0 
Further, DNA profiling can be performed on forensic samples that 
are somewhat dried or aged, whereas traditional blood typing cannot. 
The structure of DNA in a cell nucleus is more robust than the cell 
itself. Successful tests have been known to be performed on samples 
up to four years old. IOI Attempts have even been made to test DNA 
samples extracted from an Egyptian mummy I O 2 and from remains 
believed to be those of an infamous Nazi doctor.I O 3 
(b) Parent a g e 
DNA technology can be used to resolve a wide number of disputes 
about whether two people are related, since an individual 's DNA is 
inherited, half being contributed by each parent. The technique could 
be applied as unequivocally strong evidence of a biological 
relationship in paternity 104 and maternity disputes, immigration, or 
inheritance claims. Most issues of parentage will arise 111 the context 
of civil claims, although criminal offences in matters of immigration 
or incest might also require a family relationship to be established. 
Many people believe that the impact of DNA profiling in parentage 
disputes will be so great as to render conventional bloodgroup testing 
obselete. Needless to say, commercial laboratories who do not offer 
conventional tests, such as DNA Diagnostics and Genetic Technologies, 
lOO J J Barr, above n 12, 513. The tests cannot usually be done on feces, hair 
with no roots, red blood cells, or dead skin. 
10 1 C M Tande, above n 19, 481, and P Gill, A J Jeffreys and D J Werrett 
"Forensic application of DNA 'fingerprints"' (1985) 318 Nature 577. The latter 
is a study of the effects of aged and degraded samples. 
102 Noted by J J D Greenwood and R M White, above n 19, 147. 
l03 Noted by B Selinger and E Magnusson, above n 23, 8. 
104 Whether for the purposes of maintenance, Social 
paternity orders (section 47 Family Proceedings Act 1980). 
Welfare benefits or 
advocate that blood tests are unnecessary and of limited value because 
of the accuracy of DNA analysis. On the other hand, Blood Transfusion 
Centres who continue to conduct conventional tests as well, 
recommend that DNA profiling should only be used in conjunction 
with other tests, at least in the early stages while there is so much 
unresolved about DNA analysis. This is 111 accordance with a 
recommendation from the International Society for Forensic 
Haemogenetics.105 
4,2 Limitations 
A major limitation of DNA profiling is that it is very labour 
intensive, and needs "both meticulous expertise and much 
experience."106 The testing process is neither quick nor cheap, 
taking more than two weeks to complete in many instances. Hence for 
forensic investigations, DNA testing will usually be restricted to cases 
involving serious assaults, including murder and sexual offences. In 
paternity disputes, legal aid should be available to cover the costs of 
testing in appropriate cases.107 
Although the tests are generally conducted by highly skilled 
scientists and technicians, no scientific procedure is immune from 
error, as will be seen below in the famous Castro case. As a specific 
example, the "continuity" of samples might be broken because of a 
mix-up caused by accidental mislabelling. Instruments and reagents 
could be contaminated. Enzyme digestion of the DNA may be 
incomplete, or distortions 111 the gel may arise . Experimental 
105 This area of debate is further discussed by B M Zimmerman "DNA Parentage 
Testing - The New Zealand Context" (1990) submitted for LLB(Honours) at 
Victoria University of Wellington, 14, and in Comment "DNA - the debate goes 
on: test techniques under scrutiny" (1990) 341 Law Talk 21. In the latter it is 
noted that: 
For some time now the Family Law Committee of the New Zealand Law 
Society has been monitoring developments relating to DNA testing and 
the use of such tests in resolving paternity disputes. 
Also see "Lawyers warned - DNA tests not infallible as proof of paternity" 0 tago 
Daily Times, Dunedin, 23 October 1990. 
l06 B E Dodd "DNA Fingerprinting in Matters of Family and Crime" (1985) 318 
Nature 506 
107 See B M Zimmerman, above n 105, 23. 
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conditions such as time, temperature or chemical concentration might 
be incorrect. I O 8 
Most laboratories have their own protocols and quality controls to 
alleviate the chance of error. However there are no universal 
guidelines, partly because of the number of different techniques and 
types of probes currently used. Laboratories tend to formulate 
standards in association with others that use similar procedures. 
The techniques are usually subject to patent, which has created a 
"virtual monopoly over testing procedures"_ l O 9 The strongest 
competition has been amongst the major commercial testing 
laboratories in the United States, arousing concern that a profit motive 
may interfere with the integrity of their testing. 
suggestion by two American authors that: 11 0 
This has led to a 
[t]he laboratories, in the ru s h to meet the market for forensic 
tests, may have made too many simplifying assumptions and cut 
too many corners. 
In the writer's view, there arc probably two reasons why a similar 
problem has not developed in New Zealand. One is that, a t present, this 
country's police forensic testing is all performed by the DSIR, unlike 
the position in Australia and the United States, where private 
laboratories do a significant proportion of forensic DNA testing . In 
New Zealand none of the private laboratories, except for Genetic 
Technologies based in New South Wales, have experience or 
background in forensic testing. 
The second reason is that the commercial marketing of DNA 
profiling techniques is relatively new in New Zealand. DNA evidence 
is only just beginning to be presented and challenged in our courts. It 
may be that in a few years time the competition between the private 
10 8 K Reed "Potential Sources of Artifacts and errors in generating a 'DNA 
profile'" in DNA and Criminal Justice: Conference Proceedings, above n 23, 103, 
contains an extensive list of possible errors in the testing procedure. 
1 o9 A Hall "DNA Fingerprints - Black Box or Black Hole?" [1990] 140 New LJ 
203, 204. 
110 W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 61, 25 
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laboratories for civil dispute testing here will be just as fierce as it has 
been overseas.111 
It will have become clear that a critical limitation m criminal 
investigation work is the quantity, age and quality of the sample 
obtained from the crime scene or victim. In most cases repeat tests 
cannot be done, whereas they can in most civil claims. Much 
ultimately depends upon the when and how the samples are collected, 
and the subsequent storage conditions. Of the victims who do report 
sexual offences, many do so too late for a sample to be obtained. These 
sorts of factors have caused at least one author to say that the greatest 
application of DNA testing is in relation to paternity determinations, 
while in the criminal arena it will have a more limited impact. 11 2 
The same author points out that a further limiting factor in 
criminal testing is where there is no real doubt about the identity of 
the suspect l l 3. The real utility of DNA profiling can be overstated m 
allegation of sexual assault for example, because the existence or non-
existence of consent is often the critical evidential issue . 
technology can, of course, offer nothing to resolve this question. 
DNA 
Another problem likely to be encountered with DNA evidence, 
although not connected to the actual testing procedures, is the issue of 
consent to body sample tests and the power of authorities to take 
samples.11 4 
III, DNA EVIDENCE IN COURT 
While the legal system has had considerable experience dealing 
with scientific evidence, DNA testing is especially challenging because 
of its unusual complexity and the difficult statistical issues it raises. 
Since obtaining a DNA profile and interpreting the results demands a 
high degree of technical expertise, it is clearly within the realm of 
11 1 It should be noted that, perhaps not in significantly, the New Zealand private 
laboratories offering DNA testing services embarked on advertising campaigns 
soon after the technology was available. 
112 I Freckleton, above n 2, 27-28. 
1 13 I Freckleton, above n 2, 27 
114 See above n 11 
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expert evidence when tendered as proof in the law. The next few 
sections briefly consider the general principles which govern expert 
testimony. 
5,1 General Admissibility of Expert Eyjdence 
Expert witnesses represent an exception to the rule that witnesses 
are not permitted to express an opinion. They are entitled, and indeed 
expected, to draw inferences from their own observations where 
judges and jurors are not equipped to draw the proper conclusions 
themselves. The facts upon which an expert's opinion is based must 
also be admitted in evidence. 
The boundaries of expert evidence extend to take in all matters 
where a tribunal of fact requires assistance to resolve specialised, 
scientific or technical issues that are beyond the experience and 
knowledge of laypeople. Testimony on matters within "ordinary 
human experience" 115 is inadmissible since it usurps the function of 
the judge or jury. 
As a general rule, no witness can state their opinion on the ultimate 
issues to be determined m a case. The rationale is that if an expert 
could express an opinion on the very question which the fact finder is 
to decide, that would "[tend] to shift responsibility from the bench or 
the jury to the witness box".116 This rule has been the subject of 
cnt1c1sm, and in some jurisdictions it has been eroded or 
reformulated_ 11 7 Cross supports the "better and simpler solution" of 
l l5 R v Turner [1975) 1 AllER 70, 74 (CA) per Lawton LJ. In this case the 
evidence of a psychologist regarding the accused's personality was held to be 
inadmissible because the information was within the knowledge of ordinary 
human experience. 
l l6Joseph Crosfield & Sons v Technichemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 
378, 379 
11 7 Some Australian cases are cited in D L Mathieson Cross on Evidence 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1989, 4NZed) at para 15.16, where the rule has been 
taken to exclude opinion only on the application of an "essentially legal 
standard". While acknowledging academic support for this approach, the author 
of that text does not find it workable. 
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accepting opm1on wherever it is helpful to the court to do so, 
irrespective of the status of the issues to which it relates. I 1 8 
Expert witnesses must qualify themselves to the court prior to the 
admission of opinion evidence. The assessment of their qualification 
and competence is a question for the trial judge. Experts may give 
evidence that is partly based upon the writings and research of others. 
Portions of such works might be put to him or her m cross-
examination, and in this way published literature can be used as 
evidence in the case. I 1 9 It is unclear whether the judge or jury are 
permitted to form opinions on the basis of their own research of 
authoritative works on a subject. I 2 0 
In summary, it might be useful to consider all expert testimony as 
subject to two main constraints. One is relevancy, and the other is 
that it must be of some assistance to the trier of fact. 
s,2 Novel Scientific Evidence 
A special rule governing the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence exists in a majority of United States jurisdictions. It has 
become known as the Frye test, after the case from which it originated 
in 1923. 121 Under this test expert evidence will only be admissible if 
l l 8 Cross on Evidence, idem. This approach has been implemented by some 
English case law and statutory provisions. It is also the approach of the US 
Federal Rules: see below n 123. 
l l 9 For example in R v Abadom (1983] 1 AllER 364 (CA) (Home Office 
statistical records on which the expert's opinion was based were held to be 
admissible). 
120 Section 42 of the Evidence Act 1908 provides: 
All Courts and person acting judicially may, in matters of public history, 
literature, science, or art, refer, for the purposes of evidence, to such 
published books, maps or charts as such Courts or persons consider to be 
of authority on the subjects to which they respectively relate. 
But there are several authorities that suggest it should be limited to literature 
adduced at the trial: see Cross on Evidence, above n 117, para 15.09 (fn6). 
l2 1Frye vUnited States 293 Fl013 (DCCirc 1923), where the Columbia District 
Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's attempt to introduce evidence of a lie-
detector test. The Court also made this comment: 
Just when a scientific principle crossed the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 
Sometimes in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognised. 
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there is "general acceptance" of the technique in the relevant 
scientific community. If there is doubt whether a particular 
technique meets this standard, there will be a pre-trial hearing, 
known as a Frye hearing, to determine the question. 
While the Frye decision attempts to ensure the reliability of new 
techniques, many Unites States courts have found it vague and 
difficult to apply.122 A significant minority of states have modified 
the test, or rejected it in favour of tradi tiona 1 rules governing 
relevancy and expert testimony. Under these rules, the probative 
value of evidence from an emerging research area would be weighed 
against its prejudicial effect. I 2 3 
The Frye test has not been considered at such lengths in other 
countries. For the first time m New Zealand, McMullin J referred to 
such a rule in the 1987 Court of Appeal decision of R v B( an accused). 
He said:124 
As a precondition of admissibility the subject-matter to which 
the expert opinion relates must be a sufficiently recognised 
branch of science at the time the evidence is given ... Whether 
the area on which the witness seeks to express an opinion is 
properly the subject of expert opinion ... will be for the Court to 
decide in the light of the knowled ge prevailing at the time .. . 
The Judge does not mention Frye or other authorities on this point. 
With respect, His Honour seems to have simply presumed that the 
122 The status of the Frye test in different US jurisdictions is fully surveyed in 
M McMormick "Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility" 
[1982) 67 Iowa LR 879, 882, and in J C Hoeffel, above n 19, 496. There is further 
discussion of the justifications and criticisms of the Frye test in W C Thompson 
and S Ford, above n 9, and J J Barr, above n 12, 517. 
l 23 The US Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975, have two main sections 
relevent to scientific evidence. Rules 401-403 define relevant evidence, state 
that all relevant evidence is generally admissible, and that relevant evidence may 
be excluded on the grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time. Rules 702-
704 define and discuss the ambit of expert tesimony and opinion. See L Beeler 
and W R Wiebe, above n 19, 934. 
124 [1987) 1 NZLR 362, 367 (CA) [own emphasis]. The case considered the 
admissibility of a child psychologist's evidence in a sexual abuse case. 
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"general acceptance" test applies in New Zealand, without any 
consideration of the merits of such a rule. 
Strictly speaking, McMullin J's statement is obiter, since the Court 
did not deny that the psychologist's discipline could properly be the 
subject of expert testimony .125 However, McMullin J went on to 
confirm this principle as law two years later in the Court of Appeal 
decision of R v Accused. 12 6 He referred to it as a feature which was 
common to all the judgments in R v B l 2 7. In New Zealand then, there 
exists an equivalent of the Frye test, but it has never been applied in 
any case. 
In Australia, a principle virtually identical to the Frye standard was 
adopted in R v Lewis 128, a decision of the Northern Territory Court of 
Criminal Appeal. The Court held that the Frye test had not actually 
become law in Australia, but it produced a useful guideline for 
determining the admissibility of novel forensic evidence. Two dentists 
had been called by the Crown to testify to a method of identifying a 
rape suspect by matching bite marks. The evidence was deemed 
inadmissible because another recent case 12 9 had found no consensus 
amongst scientists as to the reliability of the technique. 
5.3 Admissibility and Weight 
In this country it would certainly be possible to hold a pre-trial 
hearing, or voir dire, on the admissibility of DNA tests in a particular 
case. The emphasis of such a hearing might be the Frye standard for 
novel scientific evidence, although considering that DNA technology 
is frequently accepted as evidence in other jurisdictions, it is doubtful 
that the Frye test alone will keep such evidence out of court. 
125 Idem 
126 [1989) 1 NZLR 714, 720 (CA). This case also considered the admissibility of 
a child psychologist's evidence in an allegation of sexual abuse. 
12 7 With respect, however, it appears that McMullin J was the only Judge to 
mention the principle in the earlier case. 
128 (1987) 29 A Crim R 267 (CCrApp, Nth Terr) 
l 29 R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 (CCrApp, Qld) 
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Alternatively, the pre-trial hearing could focus on the general 
requirements of expert testimony. Given the damning impression that 
DNA evidence can create, it may also be important to determine 
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect against a defendant, before it is received by the 
tribunal of fact. This judicial discretion becomes of major significance 
in cases involving scientific testimony which is expressed in statistical 
terms. This may be because of a court's inability to properly assess the 
evidence, or perhaps it is because of the way the evidence is presented. 
There has been some debate about which of the following matters 
should go to weight of the evidence and which to admissibility: 13 0 the 
criteria for identifying matches; the statistical probabilities; the 
adequacy of the population studies; laboratory procedures and quality 
control; suggestions of laboratory error; and the reasons that the 
suspect was selected for testing. It is submitted that all of these matters 
should normally be put to the tribunal of fact to assess. Only in cases 
where the evidence is very likely to mislead or confuse the Jury, 
should it be held inadmissible. 
Note that in paternity disputes , the evidentiary requirem ents arc 
much more relaxed than the tenor of the above discussion. A Court 
may receive any evidence it thinks fit, whether it is technically 
admissible or not.1 3 1 
Expert testimony, like any other evidence, mu st of course be 
interpreted in the context of the totality of evidence in the case. This 
important principle can be ea s ily overlooked when faced with 
technical expert evidence. There is no magical size of the likelihood 
ratio which will determine guilt or amount to proof. It follows that the 
130 See W C Thompson and S Ford, above n 9, 103, and L Beeler and W R Wiebe, 
above n 19, 938. The first of these articles discusses the American case of 
Wesley, above n 18, in which arguments were made about whether the adequacy of 
Lifecodes' laboratory procedures and population studies should go to the weight 
of the evidence or its admissibilty. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the 
issue. 
l 3 l Section 164 Family Proceedings Act 1980 
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nature of the evidence. In a case where there are conflicting views 
about the matching of DNA bands, it would no doubt be useful for a 
jury to see the profiles, as long as the appropriate jury warnings are 
given. If band matching is not in issue, there seems to be no reason 
why the autorads should be produced in evidence. 
An interesting theoretical question arises about how much of the 
complex science behind DNA profiling the legal profession need to 
understand. Most lawyers are hardly qualified to properly assess and 
challenge DNA evidence. Yet the adversary structure of our legal 
system requires that the lawyers and judges involved gain a working 
knowledge of the science in order to conduct a trial. In particular, 
counsel need a clear appreciation of the contentious points for them to 
cross-examine an expert. This is especially true for defence counsel in 
criminal cases who are unable to produce their own expert witnesses. 
None of the relevant literature can suggest any shortcuts to a detailed 
preparation by lawyers on the technical and scientific aspects. I 3 6 
It is probably fair to say that lawyers' preparation and briefing in a 
DNA case is now in the process of shifting focus. Since DNA profiling 
was first tendered as evidence a few years ago, there has been a 
tendency to concentrate on challenging the testing procedures and 
band matching involved. However, recently many people are 
beginning to realise that statistical interpretations and population 
genetics leave just as much room for scrutiny, if not more. 
5.5 Statistics in Court 
The earlier discussion on statistics in the interpretation of DNA tests 
revealed more than one way of presenting the results as evidence. The 
outcome of a DNA analysis, expressed as the chance of a coincidental 
match with "someone else", could possibly be given in the form of 
likelihood ratios, probabilities, or indices. What these 
statistics effectively do is quantify how likely some alternative 
hypothesis (usually that the DNA profile could have come from a 
l 36 J H Phillips and J K Bowen, above n 13, contains two introductory chapters 
(chs 10 and 11) on the giving of scientific expert evidence in court, focussing on 
preparation and cross-examination. 
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randomly selected member of the population) is. It was noted earlier 
that the likelihood ratio is now considered to be a very useful way of 
analysing and presenting DNA evidence, particularly in forensic 
investigation work. 
Paternity test results have traditionally been conveyed as 
probabilities of parentage, not odds or likelihood ratios, just as they are 
for conventional blood tests.13 7 At least one private laboratory in NZ 
denounces this practice and now presents evidence as an odds ratio.1 3 8 
There are also commentators who support this practice with statements 
such as, "the need for a ratio rather than a single probability cannot 
be over-emphasised"l39, and "in paternity cases experts have long 
been giving evidence in a misleading form" 140. 
A number of reasons can be given why the presentation of DNA 
evidence as probabilities should be discouraged. Firstly, it is said that 
the percentage chance for paternity, along with the paternity index, 
is "generally not well understood by those who have not had a training 
in statistics" 14 1. By contrast, "betting odds" provides a much simpler 
expression. An additional reason which specifically pertains to the 
very accurate DNA tests is comprehension of the true significance and 
magnitude of the results. For example the difference between 99.2% 
and 99.92% doesn't appear to be very significant. 142 In fact these two 
figures expressed as likelihood ratios are 1 in 124 and 1 in 1249, which 
much more readily shows that the second statistic is ten times more 
powerful that the first. 
l 37 For example, evidence was given in this form in the New Zealand paternity 
cases of Hirini v Kirkwood [1990] 5 NZFLR 521 (FC)(Inglis J) (blood tests, and a 
hypothetical DNA paternity test was also considered by the Court(p524)), and 
Byers v Nicholls (1988) 4 NZFLR 545 (HC)(Tompkins J) (blood tests). 
13 8 J M Faed and A E Knight, above n 54, 8 
l 39 B Selinger and E Magnusson, above n 23, 3 
14 0 B Robertson and A Vignaux, above n 74 
141 J M Faed and A E Knight, above n 54, 8 
14 2 Although take note that a rehearing was granted in the paternity case of 
J-Iirini v Kirkwood, above n 137, when the expert witness provided a further 
report and explanation changing the probability of paternity based on blood and 
tissue tests from 98% to 99.8%. 
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Another important motivation is that with probabilities there is 
more of a tendency not to carefully formulate the appropriate 
alternative hypothesis. Expression as a probability no doubt also 
increases the tendency to equate the scientific evidence with the 
burden of proof. If the evidence is instead presented as a likelihood 
ratio, this may help the court to properly understand and assess the 
evidence, if not the expert as well. The evidence would be in a form 
which gives the tribunal of fact better guidance as to how to combine 
the DNA statistics with the other evidence in the case. 
A further objection can be made based on mathematical principle. 
That is, probability calculations assume a prior assessment of the 
probability of the evidence, but those performing the calculations 
rarely have any other information about the case.1 4 3 In comparison, 
the prior in Bayesian analysis is a separate component from the 
likelihood ratio of a particular piece of evidence given by the expert. 
Evett l 4 4 and some other statisticians perceive a problem in 
presenting any statistical evidence in a courtroom, where most people 
will have little or no formal statistical knowledge. They believe that 
numerical odds and probabilities do not mean much to lawyers and 
jurors. The solution suggested by Evett 14 5 is to assign the following 
verbal scale to the likelihood ratio. 
LR in the range 
1 to 32 
32 to 100 
100 to 320 
320 to 1000 
over 1000 
Another suggestion is 14 6: 
1 to 10 
10 to 100 
Evidence strength 
Weak 
Fair 
Good 
Strong 
Very strong 
The evidence slightly supports C 
The evidence supports C 
14 3 Many laboratories simply assume a prior of 0.5 (ie. no more likely than not). 
144 I W Evett "Bayes and Forensic Science: Pragmatism, Compromise or Heresy?" 
(Poster presented at the Valencia Conference, April 1991), and I W Evett and J 
Buckleton "Some Aspects of the Bayesian approach to evidence evaluation" (Home 
Office, Unoted Kingdom, and DSIR, Auckland), 10. 
145 I W Evett, ibid, 3 
l 46 I W Evett and J Buckleton, above n 144, 11 
100 to 1000 
1000 and above 
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The evidence strongly supports C 
The evidence very strongly supports C 
A further scale used by one of the private New Zealand parentage 
testing laboratories is: 1 4 7 
1 to 49 
50 to 49 
over 500 
Moderate chance for paternity 
High chance for paternity 
Very high chance for paternity 
In the writer's view, those scales used alone are arbitrary and will 
only serve to obscure the evidence. Furthermore, Evett concedes to a 
problem of 
very high 
produced by 
"running out of ideas " to find verbal equivalents for the 
likelihood ratios (above 10,000), which are commonly 
DNA tests. However, these difficulties are virtually 
alleviated if the language equivalents are quoted in addition to the 
numerical statistics. Indeed they may help to put some "perspective" 
on the values. There can be no real objections to the presentation of 
both to a court, which is the current practice of the DSIR, as lon g as 
the language equivalent is stated to be the expert's opinion. 
Note that the verbal scales fall short of expressing an opinion on the 
ultimate issue to be determined . In parentage testing this will be less 
obvious than in criminal cases, since the ultimate issue is virtually the 
same as the question that the DNA results support. But the results mu st 
still be combined with all the other evidence in the case. It would 
clearly be inappropriate, and perhaps misleading, for any DNA expe rt 
to say that the evidence has been established "beyond all reasonable 
doubt." That is the business of the fact finder. Similarly, a parentage 
testing laboratory is not in a position to express an opinion about the 
likelihood or probability that "this person is the father of the 
child." 14 8 
14 7 J M Faed and A E Knight, above n 54, 8 
148 In this regard it is therefore inappropriate for laboratories to express 
conclusions in their standard forms for presenting results such as those 
contained in Appendix A (DNA Diagnostics) and Appendix B (Otago Regional 
Blood Transfusion Service). Also see B Robertson and A Vignaux, above n 74. 
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6.6 The RoJe of The Expert Witness 
The view is held by many that the adversary system is not well suited 
to the giving of expert scientific evidence. Some forensic experts have 
reported feeling that they were not able to present a true picture of 
their evidence because of the restrictive and interruptive question 
and answer procedure in a courtroom. In a worst case scenario, such 
lead to important forensic evidence not being distortion might 
disclosed.1 4 9 In common law jurisdictions like New Zealand, expert 
employed and renumerated by one of the adversary witnesses 
parties. 
are 
Despite the fact that most experts subscribe to the ethic that 
they give evidence as an impartial witness of the court rather than on 
behalf of a particular party 15 0, perceived partisanship is common. I 5 1 
Overall, the criticism is made that scientific "experts" simply become 
experts at being adversaries. 
It is a point of debate whether a system of neutral, court-appointed 
scientific experts would work more effectively . This is the practice in 
European countries like France and Norway . While there is 
considerable support for neutral "assessors" to be selected from a panel 
of approved experts, 15 2 others believe that such a system would not 
solve the present alleged flaws, and may even create some problems of 
its own. The adversarial process, it is claimed, provides the best built-
in check against bias and full disclosure.15 3 
While admitting that there are difficulties with presenting 
technical expert evidence in New Zealand's existing legal structure, it 
is submitted that the system could be improved if appropriate pre-trial 
disclosure and consultation ocurred in every case. The nature of DNA 
evidence is such that we need "to remove as far as possible the element 
14 9 See the specific examples in T Sargant and P Hill, above n 62, 24 
15 0 J H Phillips and J K Bowen, above n 13, 83 
l 5 l The perception will not always be illusory. There will inevitably be some 
witnesses whose opinions are influenced by "bias and distortion, conscious or 
otherwise." (J H Phillips and J K Bowen, above n 13, 83). 
15 2 See generally J R Spencer "The Neutral Expert: an implausible bogey" [1991) 
Crim LR 106, and A Kenny "The Expert Witness in Court" [1983] 99 LQR 197. 
l53 See MN Howard "The Neutral Expert: a plausible threat to justice" [1991] 
Crim LR 98 (to which J R Spencer's article, idem, is a reply). 
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of surprise." l 5 4 Unfortunately consultation beyond an exchange of 
experts' reports is uncommon.155 One author suggests that the 
expert's disclosure is largely controlled by his or her knowledge of the 
relevant facts of the case, since otherwise they do not know what 
crucial issues their testimony has to address.15 6 Most facts in a case 
will not be relevant to the DNA expert's evidence, however some will 
be. In particular, the scientist needs to be informed of any 
information which will restrict the population database to be 
compared, before they interpret the DNA results. 
IY, CASES 
6, New Zealand 
6,1 R v Pen fell y 
High Court 157 
In April 1990 Michael Pengelly, aged 18, was found guilty of 
murdering 77 year-old Mrs Birch of Ranui in her home on the 
evening of 8 May 1989. The case against Pengelly was that he went to 
Mrs Birch's house, removed louvre windows to get in and cut his 
finger, leaving a number of bloodstains inside and outside the house. 
He went to the bedroom, intending to rape Mrs Birch, but instead he 
stabbed her several times. 
The central issue in the case concerned the identity of the 
murderer. Four expert witnesses were called by the Crown: a 
pathologist, a fingerprint technician, a conventional bloodtyping 
scientist, and a DNA profiling expert. Counsel for the defence admitted 
that the fingerprints on the louvres were those of the accused, but he 
154 T Sargant and P Hill, above n 62, 27 
l55 Note that defence counsel have ready access to DSIR examinations in criminal 
cases (governed by Appendix II of Rules of Professional Conduct for Barristers 
and Solicitors New Zealand Law Society, 1 March 1990). 
156 DJ Gee "The Expert Witness in the Criminal Trial" [1987) Crim LR 307, 310 
15 7 Above n 3. This material is drawn from the transcript of Thorp J's summing 
up, the transcript of the DNA expert's evidence (Dr Margaret Lawton, DSIR), and a 
newspaper report the day after the jury gave its verdict: "Youth found guilty in 
DNA case" Evening Post, 7 April 1990. 
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suggested they were put there some weeks earlier during a "drinking 
binge". 
There was a short pre-trial hearingl58 about the admissibility of a 
blood sample taken from the accused and statements made by him, 
based on the way the police obtained them. A pre-trial challenge was 
not made to the admissibility of the actual DNA results being given at 
the trial, even though this is the first time DNA evidence has been 
contested in a New Zealand court. 
The DNA expert was given blood samples from the deceased, the 
accused, and six samples from the crime scene, after the blood analyst 
had finished testing them. Multilocus probes were used to obtain DNA 
profiles.15 9 Only two out of the six crime scene stains produced 
profiles that were clear enough to read: a stain from the kitchen floor 
and a stain from a net curtain. One of the reasons for this could have 
been the small quantities of DNA obtained from some samples. 160 The 
witness was thoroughly interrogated at the trial about the procedures 
and controls of the DSIR laboratory. It is perhaps interesting to note 
that the lengthy cross-examination of this witness by defence counsel 
concentrated solely on the DNA testing process, and the only questions 
about population data and statistical analysis were asked by the Court. 
On comparing Pengelly's sample with the two crime stains, Dr 
Lawton said in evidence: 161 
--t find that the results I obtained were at least 12450 times 16 2 
more likely to have occurred if the blood had originated from 
Pengelly than if it had originated from someone else... it could 
also be said that one in 12450 people would have the same profile 
158 Above n 3 
15 9 There was an attempt at re-probing with a single locus probe, although it was 
unsucessful. 
16 0 The DSIR expert testified that she had approximately between one third and 
two thirds of a microgram of DNA (after purification), whereas it was preferable 
to have in the region of at least one microgram of DNA: trial transcript p 179. 
161 Trial transcript pl 70. She later clarified that "someone else" meant a 
person selected at random from the population. 
16 2 This number was later said in evidence (transcript p 187) to be obtained 
using the 0.26x formula, where x=7. 
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as the DNA from the stains... and that Pengelly was included in 
that number. 
In the writer's opinion, this is a clear and helpful way of describing 
likelihood ratios in court. The witness then combined this result with 
the results from the conventional blood grouping testsl 63, on the basis 
that they were independent tests. She obtained likelihood ratios of 1 to 
413,300 and 1 to 177,100 for the two different sample stains, and 
explained them in a way similar to above. Overall, her conclusion was 
that "the evidence very strongly supports the premise that the two 
blood stains ... came from Pengelly"_ 16 4 
Dr Lawton also said 111 evidence, 111 answer to a question from the 
Court: l 65 
It has generally not been accepted by DSIR labs that showing 
the results of our tests to the jury is a relevant step to take. We 
feel that in doing that we are asking the jurors to become the 
experts. Instead our results are open and often subject to peer 
review by other scientists. 
Thorp J in fact admitted the autorads into evidence, his given reason 
being the possibility that the defence would call a DNA expert witness 
to give evidence. With respect, this reasoning seems to assume that a 
challenge to the DNA evidence will revolve around band matching, 
whereas it could well focus on statistical interpretation. 
the jury about trying to read the profiles as experts. 
He cautioned 
In summing up, Thorp told the jury that they should: l 6 6 
sensibly take into account that [DNA profiling] is a novel 
technique in this country, and that it is appropriate, unti I its use 
l 63 Results showed that the blood on the net curtain could have come from 3% of 
the New Zealand population including Pengelly, and the blood on the kitchen 
floor had characteristics which could be found in 7% of the population including 
Pengelly. 
16 4 Trial transcript p 171 
165 Trial transcript pl87 
16 6 Summing up of Thorp J, above n 157, 14 
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is more generally understood, to exercise some caution in 
assessing its results. 
His Honour strongly rejected the defence counsel's suggestion to the 
jury that they should "put to one side" any evidence which they could 
not interpret. It was for the jury to decide what weight they would 
give the evidence. And several times throughout the summing up, 
Thorp J reminded the jury that each piece of evidence had to be 
interpreted in the context of the whole. The original notice of appeal 
alleged misdirection by the trial Judge as to the treatment of the DSIR 
expert evidence, but this was not pursued in the appeal, quite properly 
in the Court of Appeal's opinion.I 6 7 
Court of Appeal 
At the Court of Appeal hearing of R v Pengelly, 168 before a Full 
Court, the main grounds of appeal were issues of consent and fairnes s 
in the taking of the blood sample from the accused . The appellant 's 
written submissions also advanced the point of appeal "that the 
evidence of Dr Lawton in respect of exhibit C [the autorad] was not 
reliable." While this ground was not seriously argued before the Court, 
a substantial part of the written judgment was devoted to it. The DNA 
evidence was, in a sense, challenged with the reception of new written 
evidence by the Court of Appeal.I 69 
Exhibit C had been examined after the trial by Dr Geursen, an 
Auckland molecular geneticist, and by Professor Jeffreys in England, 
who pioneered the DNA profiling technique. Each asserted in their 
affidavits that the overall quality of the exhibit was very poor, mainly 
because of extensive background smearing in all lanes, including the 
control lanes. They said that the samples from the kitchen floor and 
the curtain were "not identical" and it could not be said they were 
"indistinguishable". 
167 Above n 4, 23 
l68 Above n 4 
16 9 The reasons given for the evidence being admitted were that "this is 
apparently the first case in which evidence of DNA profiling has been led in a 
criminal trial in New Zealand", and that the additional evidence was directed to 
the reliability of the evidence placed before the jury: above, n 4, 14 and 21. 
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Further, these experts called into question the statistical weight of 
the evidence and queried the use of the band sharing frequency of 
0.26 on these facts. When Pengelly's reference sample was compared 
with Mrs Birch's reference sample, the experts found a far higher 
proportion of bands shared between the two than would be expected 
from the 0.26 figure. I 70 This proportion equated to a band sharing 
ratio of 0.62 and on that basis the "true" likelihood ratios were said to 
be only 1 in 18 or 1 in 28. 
These witnesses were not, of course, comparing either sample with 
the scene samples, thus no direct conclusions can be drawn. It seems 
their figure of 0.62 was meant to imply that Pengelly and Mrs Birch 
might have a high band sharing frequency because either: 
i) they were related (which they were not known to be), 
or ii) the New Zealand population has a much higher band sharing 
frequency than 0 .26 (which is unreali stic 171) 
or iii) there were so many errors in the testing procedures that 0.62 
is the best band-sharing frequency that can be used for the 
comparison between Pengelly and the crime stains . I 7 2 
After the reports of these two experts, Dr Lawton of the DSIR 
performed some further tests on a small amount of remaining sample 
material, as well as re-probing of the original exhibit C. Since the tests 
had been performed for the High Court trial, there had been an 
improvement in the sensitivity of the DSIR's testing techniques. 
Professor Jeffreys then prepared a second report commenting on 
these results, this time finding that the profiles were 
"indistinguishable throughout the track." 1 73 He was also able to 
170 Out of 16 different positions of bands in the two profiles, 10 were shared by 
both Pengelly and Birch. 
1 71 The conservative 0.26 band sharing frequency has been validated for use in 
New Zealand by a DSIR study, above n 81, although the study was not available 
until September 1990. 
172 Al though compare above n 61. 
l73 Above n 4, 20 
5 1 
confirm the band sharing statistic as being consistent with 0.26, 1 7 4 
not 0.62 as he had found previously. 
The Court of Appeal received these three reports together, along 
with a further affidavit from Dr Lawton. Their Honours conclusion 
was that: 1 7 5 
there is no longer evidence to support the 0.62 factor and 
Professor Jeffreys' final conclusions are entirely supportive of 
Dr Lawton . .. If the evidence from the further testing had not 
become available ... there would be no doubt that the value of the 
DNA evidence ... would be considerably reduced. 
As the reliability of the DNA evidence turned out, and since the 
strength of the Crown case depended on much more that the DNA 
evidence, it was "abundantly clear that no miscarriage of justice had 
occurred ." 176 
6.2 Byers yNicholls 177 
A brief comment is made here about this High Court deci sion, which 
was an appeal from the granting of a paternity order by the Family 
Court. Although DNA tests were not available at the time, Byers v 
Nicholls has some bearing on the principles of interpretation of DNA 
evidence. A blood test report from the Otago Regional Blood 
Transfusion Service concluded, in part, that there was a 99 % 
probability for the respondent being the child's father. Tompkins J 
dismissed the appeal as to the way the Family Court Judge had 
considered this statistical evidence, in using it to resolve a conflict of 
other evidence in favour of the applicant. 
The High Court Judge commented on the lack of a reported judicial 
consideration in New Zealand on the significance of the results of a 
174 He found the level of band sharing between the Pengelly and Birch profiles to 
be approximately 0.35, which in his opinion was consistent within the 0.26 
sampling error: above n 4, 20. 
175 Above n 4, 22 
176 Above n 4, 23 
177Aboven 137 
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blood test, particularly when expressed as a statistical probability. 
After considering some English paternity cases 178, His Honour stated 
that: 179 
[c]are must be taken not to equate a statistical or mathematical 
probability with probability to be assessed in discharging an 
onus of proof. Clearly, if the mathematical probability be a high 
one, then that finding may properly be regarded as of 
considerable significance in considering the legal 
probabilities 1 80 ... But even a high mathematical probability 
does not translate into forensic certainty ... 
Tompkins J concluded that the Family Court Judge clearly had this 
principle in mind, and that he had correctly taken the blood test 
evidence into account along with all the other evidence. While this 
decision is careful to apportion appropriate weight to the statistical 
evidence of paternity, it is submitted that the task of the Court would 
have been made easier had the evidence been presented as an odd s 
ratio. 
6,3 Lo veride:e y Adlam 181 
This is the first reported paternity case m New Zealand to involve 
DNA profiling evidence. Inglis J of the Family Court considered an 
application for a paternity order where evidence was given of both 
blood grouping and DNA tests performed by the Auckland Regional 
Blood Transfusion Service. On the blood and tissue tests, the analyst 
concluded that 1 man in 1190 could qu alify as a biological father of the 
child, and that the calculated probability of paternity was 99.9 %.
1 8 2 
The DNA test results were also usefully given in two ways, indicating a 
178 S v S [1970] 3 AIIER 107 (HL), Re JS(a minor) [1980] 1 AJIER 1061 (CA), 
Armitage v Nanchen (1982) 4 FLR 293 (Fam), Serio v Serio (1983) 4 FLR 756 
(CA), and Turner v Blunden [1986] 2 WLR 491 (Fam). 
179 Above n 137, 551 
180 A theoretical question can be raised about the relationship or difference, if 
there is one, between statistical probability and legal probability. See B 
Robertson and A Vignaux, above n 74. 
18 l Above n 6 
182 Assuming a prior of 0.5 
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99.5% probability of paternity, and that 5 out of every 1000 men would 
qualify. 
The Judge acknowledged that the DNA evidence was contested here 
on the basis of the statistical and mathematical process, not the 
scientific process. The main question to be considered was the weight 
to be given to the DNA results. An argument was made that "greater" 
weight should be given to the results because DNA is "reputed to be 
virtually infallible".183 Inglis J rejected this, deciding to accord the 
DNA tests less weight than the blood tests because of a less adequate 
database, "at least for the present". He states:18 4 
the weight to be attached to the degree of probability derived 
from it must depend on the breadth and depth of the statistical 
data base it does not take any great leap of insight to deduce 
that, as in any other statistical exercise, the result of the 
assessment is in reality no more than an informed guess. 
Inglis J also reiterated the principles from Byers v Nicholls about 
the danger of translating a high mathematical probability into 
"forensic certainty", or equating it with the burden of proof. When 
the scientific evidence was considered in the context of this case as a 
whole, against the background of inconsistencies in the applicant's 
oral evidence and another putative father suggested during the 
hearing, it did not justify a finding of paternity on the balance of 
probabilities. The Judge went as far as to say that, in general:18 5 
[the statistical likelihood of paternity] is of no evidential value 
at all unless there is a credible foundation in the other evidence 
in the case which makes it relevant, 
although it is difficult to see how this can be correct in principle. 
18 3 Above n 6, 277 
18 4 Above n 6, 278 
185 Above n 6, 281 [own emphasis] 
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7, United States 1 8 6 
7.1 State of Florida v Andrews 1 8 7 
This was one of the earliest instances of a conviction in the United 
States using DNA evidence. A DNA profile from the vaginal swab of a 
rape victim was compared with the suspect's DNA. The expert witness 
testified that the profiles were a "match", and the chance that the 
defendant's DNA would be duplicated in another person was about one 
to 840 million. 
The first trial judge held the evidence of the tests admissible, but the 
prosecution decided to withdraw the statistical evidence. The jury was 
unable to reach a verdict. This was clearly an erroneous approach, 
since the statistics are complementary to DNA tests, and are necessary 
to interpret the results. At the second trial, both the test results and 
the statistics were admitted. This time the jury convicted Andrews. 
7,2 Peoole yCastro 1 88 
DNA evidence was held inadmissible for the first time in Castro. It 
was a pre-trial Frye hearing that lasted over 12 weeks. Joseph Castro 
was charged with the murder of a seven-months pregnant neighbour 
and her two-year old daughter in the Bronx. The case against him 
depended almost entirely on DNA testing a small bloodstain found on 
his watch. Castro claimed that the bloodstain was his own. The tests 
for the prosecution were carried out by Lifecodes, whose report 
concluded that the stain "matched" the DNA of one of the victims. It 
said that the chance of a match occurring at random was 190 million to 
one. 
186 The number of American cases in which DNA evidence has been admitted is 
enormous and increasing. For a brief outline of the more important of these, see 
J J Barr, above n 12, fns 152 and 156. 
187 No CR 88/1400 (Orange County Cr Ct Fla 1988), discussed in J H Phillips 
and J K Bowen, above n 13, 114, and in A P Adema, above n 10, 387. 
188 545 NYS 2d (1989) (New York Sup Ct) Sheindlin J 
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The defence argued that in the rush to use DNA as a forensic tool, 
the need for rigourous standards had been overlooked. 
some serious deficiencies in Lifecodes' evidence: 189 
Lander reports 
- the bands (from several single locus probes) had been visually 
compared. 
- Lifccodes had their own rule (standard deviation) for declaring a 
match, which was not followed. I 9 0 
the number of matches was improperly recorded 1 9 1 
some of the probes were contaminated 
there was confusion about the control lane in the autorad 
there were problems with their population database of US Hispanics 
(including a degree of interbreeding). 
The hearing took an unusual twist when the experts for either side 
held an informal meeting and agreed upon a consensus statement 
declaring that "the DNA results were not scientifically reliable enough 
to support that the samples do or do not match."192 From that point in 
the trial, the former prosecution witnesses testified for the defence. 
Not surprisingly, Judge Sheindlin found the evidence before him to be 
inadmissible because of its unreliability. He did, however, accept the 
general validity and admissibility of DNA testing provided that certain 
safeguards were compiled with. 
There is an interesting postscript to the case. Quite soon after the 
admissibility hearing, Castro changed bis plea to guilty in return for 
the minimum sentence. Apparently he also admitted to Sheindlin J 
l 89 E S Lander "DNA Fingerprinting on trial" (1989) 339 Nature 501. Lander 
was an expert witness for the defence in Castro. Also see J C Hoeffel, above n 19, 
476-494, and I Freckleton, above n 2, 34-38. 
l 90 Proponents of the continuous model for assessing the quality of a match 
would disagree with the rule itself. I W Evett "Interpretation: A Personal 
Odyssey" (Original Paper, Home Office) says this in commenting on the Castro 
case (at p 17): 
the difficulties arose because comparisons which fell just outside an 
arbitrary threshold were ruled as matches by the expert. The root of the 
problem of course was not that they fell outside the threshold - but that a 
threshold was adopted in the first place. 
l 9 1 Lifecodes recorded three bands in identical positions in all three lanes, but 
a photograph of the autorad in E S Lander, above n 189, 503, shows that this was 
clearly erroneous. 
192 E S Lander, above n 189, 504 
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that the blood on his watch was indeed from his victims.193 The Castro 
case, however, continues to serve as a reminder of the strong need for 
the scientific community to collectively ensure adequate regulation 
and standards for DNA testing procedures. 
8, Australia 
8.1 R y Elliott 194 
A voir dire hearing to determine the admissibility of DNA evidence 
was held before Lindsay Elliott was tried for murder. The only 
bloodstain came from the jeans that the accused wore on the evening 
of the stabbing incident. Genetic Technologies conducted the tests 
using a series of single locus probes, but they only obtained a result 
for one of the probes because of the small quantity of DNA. Their 
evidence assessed the odds of somebody other than the victim having 
the same DNA as that on the jeans by coincidence as "approximately" 
210 to one. 
All parties in the case agreed that DNA profiling had become an 
"acceptable scientific technique", however the defence had a number 
of specific objections to the evidence being admitted. Its reliability 
was attacked on all the usual aspects of laboratory procedure. Hunt J 
considered that most of these issues "could be thrashed out without 
difficulty before the jury"_ 195 
The relevance of the database used for comparisons was also 
seriously questioned. This was most appropriate, considering that the 
population base was taken from a Lifecodes sample of North American 
Caucasians. To overcome genetic differences between it and the local 
Australian population which included Aboriginies, the Judge 
suggested that the jury would have to assess the chances of the blood-
source being non-Caucasian and make their own assessment of how 
193 J Phillips "A View From the Bench" in DNA and Criminal Justice: Conference 
Proceedings, above n 23, 25 
194 unrep (6/4/90) Sup Ct NSW (Crim Div), Armidale, 70154/89, Hunt J 
195 Ibid, 18 
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the "odds should be reduced accordingly" .19 6 It is suggested here that 
this task is not something each juror should do arbitrarily, but that 
they would require expert opinion to assist them. If the direction in 
Elliott can be construed as inviting the jury to make the adjustment 
without technical expert evidence, then this is quite inappropriate. 
Hunt J's decision was to admit the evidence as to the testing and 
matching of the samples, but he held the assessment of the odds to be 
inadmissible. His reason was that the odds were only stated within a 
certain "confidence level", the range of odds being 176 to 156 with a 
confidence level of 70%. As was learned in the Andrews case, 
separating the statistics from the evidence as to testing and matching 
DNA is not a proper approach. With respect, His Honour's judgment 
displays a lack of appreciation of the statistical component involved in 
analysing DNA results. 
In terms of the Bayesian likelihood ratio, the population data caused 
the Court great confusion in formulating an alternative hypothesis. 
The fact that the crime stain was found on the suspect, not at the crime 
scene, is all-important. The denominator of the likelihood ratio that 
should have been considered is the probability that Elliott would have 
"this" blood stain (E) on his clothing if he did not stab the victim 
(C).197 This question requires a study of the suspect's lifestyle and 
movements, which will determine the type of population to survey for 
band sharing data. Is Elliott a member of a group that is likely to have 
someone else's blood on his or her clothing, such as an ambulance 
driver, sportsperson, parent or violent gang member? If not, 1 9 8 
[t]aking this to its final conclusion, the finding of non-self 
blood on an office worker would result in a larger likelihood 
ratio than the same finding on a gang member. 
Where the body sample transfer is from the scene to the suspect, 
then details about the suspect are irrelevant. Obviously the court 
196 Above n 194, 25 
197 See B Robertson and A Vignaux, above n 74, and J S Bucklcton, I W Evett and 
K A J Walsh, above n 78. 
198 J S Bucklcton, I W Evett and K A J Walsh, above n 78, 8 
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required further information about why the accused might have blood 
on his clothing. This possibility was not even mentioned in the 
judgment. Nor was there reference to the number of bloodstains found 
on Elliott's clothing, or to whether a sample of Elliott's own blood was 
analysed.199 The laboratory's practice of declaring matches and non-
matches at a particular cut-off point might also be criticised on the 
basis discussed in this paper, although this point was not raised at the 
hearing. 
8.2 R vTran200 
A question about the admissibility of DNA evidence arose part way 
through the rape and murder trial of Van Hung Tran. For the Crown, 
Cellmark Diagnostics had performed DNA tests on vaginal swabs and a 
bloodstain from the deceased, and samples from the dcceased's parents. 
A combination of different probes were used, but a result from only 
one single locus probe was relied on. The analyst's conclusion was that 
the chance of an unrelated individual matching the bands from the 
stains was one in 152. The other main piece of evidence against Tran 
was an eyewitness identification by the victim's boyfriend, on the 
basis of his Vietnamese appearance. 
The defence called five expert witnesses, who testified about two 
main problems with the evidence. Firstly, there was considerable 
dispute about whether two faint bands from the crime sample were 
sufficiently clear to "match" with those in the accused's profile. The 
experts gave detailed evidence about the reading of bands, and the 
process of matching and measuring them. Incidentally, Cellmark's set 
criteria (standard deviation) for determining matches and non-
matches was not challenged. 
The second major difficulty was with the population database. The 
accused was Vietnamese, whereas the database used by Cellmark had no 
relationship to this ethnic group. It was composed of Caucasian, Afro-
Caribbeans and Asians. The most conservative band sharing ratio out 
199 As was pointed out by B Robertson and A Vignaux, above n 74. 
200 (1990) 50 ACrimR 233 (Sup Ct NSW), Mclnemey J 
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of these three groups (Afro-Caribbean) had simply been adopted as the 
basis of the Crown witnesses' mathematical calculation.201 The result 
was a likelihood ratio which was, at best, an approximation. 
In recognising the need for data relevant to the suspect's ethnic 
group, the Court had implicitly formulated the correct alternative 
hypothesis to be compared. Where the body sample transfer is from 
the offender to the scene, band sharing amongst all possible offenders 
needs to be surveyed, and information about the suspect's lifestyle 
becomes irrelevant.202 The population surveyed in Tran had to be 
modified because of the extra background information from the 
eyewitness identification that the offender was Vietnamese. Although 
it is not made clear in the judgment, without the eyewitness 
connection the best that could have been done is to model bandsharing 
in the general population, despite the fact that the suspect himself was 
Vietnamese. 
The Judge decided not to admit the DNA evidence, concluding that 
it:203 
would have a tendency to produce a misleading and confusing 
impression for the jury ... I am of the opinion that the jury would 
not be in a position ... to determine the issues I believe they 
would be speculating [T]he state of the evidence is 
unsatisfactory because of the fact that there is no database for 
Vietnamese. 
As an alternative ground, Mclnerney J would have exercised his 
discretion to exclude the evidence on the basis that its weight was 
outweighed by its prejudicial influence on the minds of the jury. 
201 The different band sharing ratios from these groups gave odds ratios of 1 in 
152 (Afro-Caribbean), 1 in 200 (Caucasians), and 1 in 243 (Asians): ibid, 235 
202 See J S Buckleton, I W Evett and K A J Walsh, above n 78, 4 
203 Above n 200, 242 
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Y, CONCLUSION 
DNA profiling is a dramatic step forward in the field of forensic 
science. This new technology has the potential to provide a form of 
evidence to judges and juries upon whose accuracy and reliability they 
can rely with confidence. DNA testing is no doubt about to take New 
Zealand's criminal justice system "by storm", and in the paternity 
context, it is envisaged by many that DNA profiling will eventually 
render conventional blood tests redundant. 
In order to preserve the potential of this scientific procedure, still 
in its infancy, calls for scrutiny and caution in assessing the value of 
DNA evidence are made within both the scientific and legal 
communities. The first wave of challenge to this technology being 
presented as evidence in court, questioned the accuracy and reliability 
of DNA testing. Numerous authors have advocated that laboratories 
need to be regulated by uniform standards and protocols for quality 
control. In the writer's opinion, however, this aspect of DNA profiling 
will always be heavily reliant on the individual skill and integrity of 
scientists. 
More recently the focus of challenges to the reliability of DNA 
evidence has begun to shift to how the DNA results are interpreted . 
Courts are now grappling with even more difficult questions about 
population genetics and statistical methods. It is because of this 
further aspect of the evidence that:2 0 4 
counsel need more than an understanding of the technique of 
DNA profiling per se. A knowledge of the science of analysis 
generally would [be of great benefit]. 
There are inherent problems in calling on lawyers, judges and 
jurors, none of them trained in science or statistics, to conduct a 
critical evaluation of DNA evidence. Many of the difficulties are 
encountered in all forensic scientific evidence, and in expert 
testimony generally. But there are ways of minimising the 
204 S J Young, above n 17, 267 
6 1 
technicality, confusion and overbearing influence of scientific 
evidence, and greater advantage needs to be taken of these. One way is 
pre-trial consultation between the experts and lawyers about the 
contentious aspects of the evidence. Another is presenting DNA 
evidence as a "likelihood ratio of two relevant, positive and specific 
hypotheses"205, which, it has been suggested, is the most simple, least 
confusing way of conveying DNA results. 
205 B Robertson and A Vignaux, above n 74 
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PATERNITY ANALYSIS 
1, INTRODUCTION 
DNA Diagnostics has performed lingerprinting analysis on the samples below. The 
analysis uses the fact that the bands that are scored 1n these tests are inherited. Half of 
an individual's bands should be inherited from their mother, and half from their father. 
There should be very !ew (if any) bands in a child that are not present in either the mother 
or father. 
2. SAMPLES ANALYSED 
Blooo donor Bands scored Probes & enzymes used 
Mother: X Nm• 
Child: Y Ne= 
Father: z 
3. ANALYSIS OF CHILD'S BANDS 
Number of bands in common with mother, M a 
Number of bands in common with lather, P = 
Number of bands in common with both, B .. 
Number o! bands in common with neither, U :.: 
4. PROBABILITIES 
The probabilities oi obtaining the results above have been calculated (as explained in the 
accompanying sheets), on the basis o! two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Z is the biological father of Y. 
Calculated probability "' 
Therefore reject/fail to reject hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 2. Z is not tl,e biological lather of Y 
Calculated probability = 
Therelore reject/!ail to reject hypothesis 2 
The !ollowing results are unusual or atypical in this case: 
5. CONCLUSION 
lt ls the conclusion of DNA Diagnostics that: Z is the biolo9ical father of Y 
Z is not the biological lather ol Y 
... paternity report 
Analysis of results: 
ref:91/43 
The following statistical calculations and conclusions have been 
produced from examination of the test results in this case: 
1. It is not possible to exclude from being the 
mother of nd it is not possible to exclude 
from being the father of 
2(a) The gercentage of random males excluded from paternity o'f 
the child,~••••••••lborn to•••••••••s 99.8%. 
(b) The chance for a random male to father a child with the same 
test results as •••••••••••with this mother, is 1 in 
71,429. 
3. The odds ratio for being the father of 
the child is 322:1. The odds ratio is the number of times that 
is more likely to be the father of the 
child than is a random male. 
In conclusion: 
child 
has a high probability for paternity of the 
Statistical evaluation of this case shows that a very high 
proportion of random males can be excluded from paternity. The 
set of tests will therefore exclude with virtual certainty a male 
who is wrongly alleged to be the father. 
Yours faithfully, 
J.M. FAED B.Med.Sc. (Otago), M.B. Ch.B. 
(Otago), F.R.C.P.A. 
Director, 
Otago Regional Blood Transfusion Service 
A.E. KNIGHT, FIMLS., MNZIMLS. 
Charge Technologist, • 
Otago Regional Blood Transfusion Service 
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